Oroville Ad Hoc Group Meeting October 30, 2018

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Oroville Ad Hoc Group Meeting October 30, 2018


– So, we’ll start with introductions. We do have our fifth board
member here so we need to do the round introduction one more time here. Maybe that we’ll just start that right now so that we can pass the time. – [John] Okay. Okay, so John… (rustling and mumbling) I get it. – I’m the Sheriff of Butte County. – Again, Wade here is our new member, is who we’re introducing ourselves to… – [John] That’s not
going all the way down. – [Technical Male] Let
me see it, yeah it does. – Hi, my name is Bruin Storeson. Name tag says Wrist Man. – Larry Grinman, Recreation
(papers rustling). – Sean Early, Richfeild
Arrogation District, Ad Hoc for Water Supply. – Matt Mantake, citizen of Yuba city, four time evacuee of Orville. – Ron Stewart, Feather River
Ad Hocs (papers rustling). – Laura Hayes representing
Congressman Ed LaMalpha. – Bern Springload Assembly
Member Gallagher’s Office. – [Announce] Care to go around the back? – Tara Alpo, Parks and West. (speakers mumbling) – Eric Tonslaker (mumbling). – Eliza Whitmore, Public
Information Officer for the Department of Water
Resources here in Oroville. – Hi, John Layhi, I’m an Operation Manager for the Department of Water Resources. – Good to go, thank you, sir.
– Thanks. – Wes Hunter with HDR (muttering). – Eda Manning from Counsel
Oaks, Consulting with NDWR. – Steve Daring, NDWR Consulting. – DR Barton, DNA. – Ted Crandall, Assistant
Deputy Director for the state water factory. – Derek Belt, a sheriff’s office. – I’m Dan William and I’m a member– – [Loud Male] We should probably get. – Betty Andrews, member of the IRB. – Larry Media, member of the IRB. – Bruce Smaller, member of the IRB. – Paul Shwiger, member of the IRB. – Dix Circus, NDWR, I
manage the state water project of Dam Safety Program
and moving on past three. – All right, well thank you. So, in your packet here, we
have the agenda for today. And so, I just want to quickly go through what we’re going to cover today here. So we started, we put the
meeting purpose on here which, this came right out
of the charter for our new, and so we’re getting you
here as the ad hoc group is reviewing and commenting
on the efforts related to CNA, the efforts developed in
the comprehensive needs assessment for public
safety related to orbital valiance of appurtenant structures. And in this specific meeting,
what we’re trying to do is go over our objectives are, we’re
providing the ad hoc group with further clarification
of what the CNA effort, what we need our visions to be, understanding of the revised
project plan in light of the promise that we
received from the IRB and from the ad hoc group, and then also talking about the
linkages between this effort and the water and full maintenance of it. It’s a topic we heard about last time, we put a lot of emphasis in. And then we also want to
talk about two of the tasks, the task three and task five. These are the tasks that we
have some work that we’ll place where we greater report out on. So, for the agenda, we’re to
have done the introductions here, our opening remarks
we’ll go through the five presentations that are
basically very similar to what was reported to the IRB so that is, these different presentations
cover the areas that are out. After that then, we’re gonna
talk about, look at the common logs, this is DWR’s responses
to the comments that the IRB had provided. Take a break. And then we will have the
IRB talk about their report that they made after their
last meeting with DWR, the second meeting
between DWR and the IRB. And then we have allotted 40
minutes for the ad hoc group to ask questions of the IRB, the BWR, about any of those responses
that you’ve been provided to the ad hoc’s first round of
comments or the new material that we have here today. And then we want to spend
about 10 minutes just talking about the schedule leading
up to our third meeting. So when different, you should
expect additional information and we’re expecting comments
back, go through that schedule. And then we have an
open item for three new CNA-related issues that
we want to bring up. And then that’s our, then we adjourn. So we’re shooting for 11
o’clock, but we do have a very packed schedule so, with that, I’ll turn it over to Senator Gallagher. for any opening comments. – You know, I just want
to thank everybody again for taking time out of, I know, busy schedules and
being here this morning. You know, I think each and
every member here, you know, adds a lot to this discussion
and is gonna help ensure that this, you know, CNA is
a robust document that takes into account the real needs of this area. And I also want to thank DWR
staff for remaining engaged with us, for your cooperation, for everybody being here today. So look, I don’t want
to belabor that too much but I just want to thank
everybody for all their attention to this and I think let’s
just dive right into it ’cause I think everybody’s
really wanting to, is anticipating the summary
and discussion of the next task in the second meeting that transpired. – Sounds good. So with that, have your, John– – Yes– – [Eric] So do I give them? – Oh yes, yeah, Eric, you
wanna cover that real quickly just so we, last time we did
have some trouble with getting the audio so you’ll notice we
have a lot more microphones in the room this time and so
Eric will just cover a little bit of the mic etiquette. – So the co-chairs should
have you on the mics so you guys are mic’ed all the time. I think Joy, you might have
worn two for the other members of the ad hoc group, you
have these four mics here so you just push the button on and off to wait when you’re speaking,
and just as a reminder, when you speak into
the mic it works great. If you’re not speaking into the mic, it doesn’t have it quite as clearly. So we’ll put out some reminders there. Before the speakers,
there’s a mic up there and I have a second roaming mic. So, especially when IRB
members have something to say, raise your hand, we’ll get a mic to you. And you are welcome to grab that one. (heavy breathing) – If your mics are on now, turn them off. – [Eric] Yeah, you can turn them off now. – You wanna turn off your green light? – Yeah. – All right well, good morning, everybody. I’m Ted Crandall, good
to see you all today. So, you know, as a result
of the first meeting of the Independent Review Board
and also our first meeting with the Ag Hoc Committee
here, we received some feedback regarding the overall scope of the project and I think a request
for further clarification what the scope of the Oroville Dam Safety Comprehensive Needs Assessment is. So, what we thought we’d do
today in the first couple presentations is drill a little
bit more and take a little bit deeper dive into
the scope of the effort and as John mentioned,
we’ll get into a little more of the technical studies moving forward. So, in June of 2017, DWI
transmitted a formal letters to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the State’s Division of Safety of Dams indicating that we were
planning to conduct this Dam Safety Comprehensive Needs Assessment for the Oroville facilities. And at the time, we pointed
out that over the past decade, there have been various efforts
underway at the Oroville facilities related to either
our part 12 dam safety review effort, some that the
DWR initiated such as our equipment for viability
efforts that are ongoing, and then we know that we
thought it was important in the context of this bill
way incident that we perform a comprehensive review of
the Oroville facilities to ensure their safety and reliability. So then in January of this year, we followed up with an additional filing with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the state’s division of Safety of Dams to really kind of lay out
in a little more detail what we were planning to embark upon. So we pointed out that this
effort was to identify measures to restore and improve
the safety and reliability of Oroville Dam and the
appurtenant structures. And then we identified the
six major tasks that we were going to pursue and that
included examination of the spillways, their capacity
and their ability to handle the probable maximum flood. Task two was associated
operational review of the reservoir and the outflow from both the spillways and the outlet words. Task three was taking a
look at the gate structures for the main spillway. And then task four was an
examination of the outlet capacity of the Oroville Dam facilities. Task five was, you know,
examination of the Oroville Dam embankment and the associated, the dams associated with Lake Oroville. And then task six was, is, I should say, looking at the instrumentation
for the Oroville Dam Project. So as I mentioned at the
start of the presentation, we received comments from those on the Independent Review
Board and the Ad Hoc Committee. You know, suggesting or
recommending I should say, that we explain in a little
more detail the scope of this effort. And so, this particular
slide includes a quote from the Independent Review
Board that just noted that they thought that this
need for additional clarity would be helpful for the
effort to ensure that everyone has a clear understanding of
the scope of this project. And then additionally, the Ad
Hoc Committee also provided the recommendation and noted that the term Comprehensive Needs
Assessment could be viewed in different ways by
members of the public. And as suggested also, or we
took this as it was important for us all to clarify the
focus of this effort as well. So we appreciate both the
boards and the committees comments in this regard
and took those to heart as we were moving forward in this. And so, our overall response to the Independent Review Board
and the Ad Hoc Committee’s comments as we agree with those points in that it is important for
us to clarify that the focus of this is on the evaluation
of the infrastructure associated with the Oroville Dam. And then we thought, or our
intention is today to dig a little bit deeper… To get in a little bit
more detail on the scope of the project, the rationale for selecting the focus we’ve made, and then additionally, you
know, as we move forward we’ll have some additional
presentations that get into that. – [Male] This is good. – So, when the project was
initially conceptualized, we used the title
Comprehensive Needs Assessment because it’s a common title that our Division of Operation of
Maintenance and that we use in the state water project
for our infrastructure evaluations and it was
conceptualized to be a component by component look at the
Oroville Dam facilities, very similar to what the United
States Bureau of Reclamation does as part of their Comprehensive
Facility Review process. And so our plan is to look
at the structural facility, or the facility components of the effort, and then also the Dam Safety
Performance consideration associated with those structures. And so, from the structural perspective, this effort’s been developed
to look at the impounding facilities or the dams, in this case associated
with Lake Oroville, so the main dam and the saddle dams, the head works for the
spillway would fall in that category as well. Also, take a close look at
the spillway for this project, or the spillways. Additional component is
the outlet for a reservoir. Those would be commonly looked at as part of a dam safety review. And then additionally the
instrumentation associated with the project as well. One thing I’ll point out here is we did, we did include these identifiers
after the main categories here on this slide and
the next slide as kind of a designation for the
categories that we’re looking at and you’ll see in a couple
other slides we included a table to help explain
how we’re examining these. And then from a performance consideration, the types of things that you’d
look at and will be looking at in this study is the
stability of the facilities, specifically the dam
embankment, the saddle dams, and the other facilities. We’ll take a look at
the safety and capacity of the spillways, the
hydraulic characteristics. We’ll also be taking a look
at the outlet and their integrity and the capacity
of the outlets associated with the Oroville Dam Complex. We’ll be looking at, you
know, seepage and leakage from the facilities. That’s something that’s
common to a dam safety review as well. And then additionally
the surveillance data, the performance monitoring
trends, and that information on how the structure has
performed over the years. And again on this slide, we’ve
included these designators, as you’ll see that we’ve
included in the next couple of slides a table and a
matrix just to kind of explain the linkage to the
Comprehensive Needs Assessment. So this particular
slide just, again, lists more in a table format the designators and the types of
structures we’re examining. So, S1 we’ve identified as
the impounding facilities, or the dams, S2 the spillways, S3 outlets, instrumentation, and then
similarly when you look at performance walking through the lists from the previous slides. And then we put together just
to help maybe characterize, you know, how we’re examining
things in this effort, is this matrix table that
illustrates the six main tasks in the Dam Safety
Comprehensive Needs Assessment and then the area of focus
from those designators. And so our intent here was
just to show or to illustrate how these different tasks
that we’re looking at connect back to the main areas
of study that are typically performed in a dam safety evaluation. So we thought this would be
kind of a helpful overview as we continue to embark upon this effort. Another thing that we’ve taken
into consideration and put thought to are the comments from the Independent
Forensic Team that reviewed the spillway incident. And on this particular slide, we’re repeating at a high
level the main categories of areas that the Independent
Forensic Team identified as important lessons
learned for the dam industry in the United States and across the world. And I think what we wanted
to point out as we were developing our tasks that are part of the Dam Safety
Comprehensive Needs Assessment that these different elements
are basically incorporated or covered as part of the
study as we move forward. So the IFT pointed out
that physical inspections are an important part of
any dam safety evaluation but they also noted that
in addition to that, it’s important for dam owners
to perform comprehensive facility reviews like
we’re proposing as part of this effort. They also pointed out
that regulatory compliance is another important
thing for dam owners to do but, you know, additionally
it’s important to kind of go above and beyond that, and
that’s really why we’ve embarked upon this
Comprehensive Needs Assessment is to, you know, take that
additional step beyond just pure regulatory compliance. They also identified that, you know, the Failure Mode Analysis
that has been typically done as part of the FERC process needed to, their recommendation was
to expand that beyond just to look at uncontrolled
release of the reservoir and that’s our intention
as part of this process is as we get into the risk
analysis early next year that we’ll be taking a look
at not only the embankment and the reservoir but the
structures as recommended by the forensic team. Then lastly, they pointed out
the importance of an owner’s dam safety program and having
a good dam safety culture and an organization and
that’s something we’re also looking at in a different
effort through the FERC process to enhance our dam safety program as well. So then, you know, we also,
I heard from the ad hoc group some interesting and some other topics beyond just the physical
evaluation of the structures, specifically in examination
of, you know, how we’re taking a look at our organization, regulatory, the industry framework,
the Water Control Manual, update process, use of forecast informed
reservoir operations, and also how facility
security would be addressed. So in our letter to the ad hoc group, we included some detailed
information in a table to address those comments. We appreciate the input and so
just for the purpose of today repeated that table in this presentation. John Lahey, later in
the day, will be talking more specifically on
the water control manual and the forecast informed
reservoir operations components. So, I won’t get into that there, or in this presentation. But I did want to mention
that the organizational side is something that we are
looking at as part of our update to the owners dam safety program. And then additionally
from the facility security perspective, you know, that’s
an area where we’re engaged with Homeland Security,
Office of Emergency Services, law enforcement entities
both at the federal, state, and local level, and
then that all rolls into, at least in the case of these facilities, kind of a FERC umbrella and
also a NERC umbrella as well. So we have a robust security
program that falls into those categories and of course
there’s sensitivity related to the security of the facilities to ensure that they’re protected. So I think we just wanted
to highlight that there are some other venues that we’re
addressing these topics and as part of this effort
we’re a little more focused on the structures and the
dam safety evaluations of those structures. So with that then, it was
really intended to kind of be our opening and I’ll be
turning it over to Sergio to kind of get into a little
more detail on this effort. – Thank you, Ted. – I wanna just keep things moving along, so what I would say is, you know, look, I think you guys have seen our comments, I think we still stand by those comments that there are we do need
to think, and by the IRB’s comments that we need
to think more broadly about these things, and that I understand, we understand there’s
separate processes that govern some of these components. But, we believe that some of
the discussions we’re having here can help inform those,
how you go about those things, and maybe the strategy that
you employ with those things, and so speaking just on
behalf of the ad hoc, if I might for just a second, I still think we need to, you know. And that’s a conversation we
can keep having going forward I guess, but you know, and I
think we’re gonna get into it in a later discussion here. But, there were recommendations
for having a task seven, you know, and for having, you
know, for going a little bit more broadly in certain areas
and, it just sounds like oh, well, we’re gonna tighten it back down. I’m just, you know, it’s
probably something where we’re having a little bit of a I guess, respectful disagreement, I guess. But, I wanna get into
the meat of this stuff, I think that’s really important. So I’ll just leave it with that. And then maybe we can go
into Sergio’s presentation. – Yeah, and we appreciate
those comments, Assemblyman. I guess before I pass it off
to Sergio, I just wanted to say I don’t think our intention
was to clamp it down. I think we were just
trying to clarify what, at least from a dam safety
facility evaluation scope that we’re looking at. But yeah, we’re definitely
available to talk. – [Assemblyman] No, I’m glad
to hear that’s not the intent. – Thank you, Ted. (woman muttering) – Oh okay, thank you. So I’m not gonna spend a whole
lotta time in this slide. Ted pretty much covered the six topics. Assemblyman, you mentioned a task seven, the Integration Team, that’s
in essence, our task seven. So, we have listened both you and the IRB and we have formed, we’re
not calling it a task because that’s more of
a, at the project level, instead of at the task level. So, it’s Integration Team. So, just going back to where we started, we started in essence as
six independent tasks. It was originally envisioned
that the various tasks would have their own
workshops and deliverables. Now, as part of this new strategy
or new plan going forward, a lot of this work has
actually been risen or elevated to the integration team. That’s where the bulk of the integration is going to take place. So, we’ll work closely with
the individual task leads and members of those teams
but the bulk of the work now is going to be performed
at the integration level. Since we last met, there
was some federal legislation that was passed September 10th, basically requiring that FERC, as part of the Part 12D,
they require that Oroville perform a level two risk
analysis on the complex. So, taking all this into
account, we have reworked the work plan and come
up with a new schedule which I’ll show, that’s my last
slide in this presentation. So, this slide basically
shows all the work that the Integration Team is
currently working on. A lot of it is what we heard
both from the IRB and ad hoc the first go around. So we’re developing the
guideline, guiding principles, developing a project management plan for the Integration Team, developing and tracking
comprehensive CNA schedule, tracking Independent Review
Board recommendations and CNA responsive. And John is going to touch
on this a little later. Determining current and future
without project conditions, I have a slide on that. Identifying what’s working well, applying value analysis to the CNA, developing and enforcing
CNA quality management plan, that was one of the comments from the IRB, developing strategy for
adapting climate change, outlining final report and glossary. So, once again, the
CNA project is a study. You know, we’re not developing,
we’re not at the stage where we’re gonna design something. So, as part of the study
we’re going to identify objectives, constraints,
opportunities, and needs. Basically, any issues. Once those issues are
identified, we’re gonna develop, or each task is going to
develop measures to address those issues. Once the individual task
leads have gone through their analysis, eliminated
any inferior measures, then the Integration Team is
going to formulate the plans. We could have two to seven
plans, we still don’t know. We have to go through that process. Those plans will be
evaluated using metrics and then compared and ranks appropriately. The last item, as was
mentioned at the first meeting, we would then transmit the
information to executive and then they ultimately
make the final decision. This is kind of the same
thing in a graphical form. The difference is that the
integration team is that bar that goes across the top. So we’ll be involved from
the beginning to the end. The other item that I
like to highlight here is at the bottom,
there’s that Part 12 PFMA for Level Two Risk Analysis. It’s got it’s own schedule. It’s not part of the CNA. However, numerous CNA
members will participate in those meetings and
information coming out of it will be useful for the CNA efforts. – Sergio, can I just add that
that Part 12D Risk Assessment will have a different board because FERC in their legislation said that we needed to have a FERC-Approved Board. So, there will be a board reviewing that because that will then
continue as part of it’s own Part 12D Process but then be the feeder into our CNA project. – Shouldn’t we do an addendum for it? – It will be, yeah. – Another independent– – Another independent board. – So, CNA measures, they’re
basically a feature activity that can implement, can
be implemented to address one or more dam safety opportunities. Some examples are modify or
a new spillway structure, new higher-capacity low-level outlet, addition of piezometers to the embankment. You know, we’re gonna,
like I said, have measures for all six tasks. These are just some of the
examples that are considered measures to improve the dam safety. – [Male] We did only have
that for the last 50 years. – Now, the measures
like I mentioned before, they’re identified by each task team. These measures will be
looked at and reviewed by technical experts on those
teams and inferior ones will essentially be eliminated. The best measures will
then get carried forward, or move forward, to be part of the plans that will be put together. So the CNA alternative
plans, these are the plans that will meet the
objectives at some level. They may include some
measures, may include a measure from each individual one or they may not include any measures form some of them. So, you know, we won’t know
that until we actually go through the process. This graph, or this cartoon I called it, shows how there’s different combinations. So for plan one, you know,
we’re taking a measure from each of the six individual tasks. Plan two, we’re taking
two measures from task one and task three. The plan three, we are
not including any measures from task four. The last plan, we’re including
three measures from task one, one from task two, and one from task six. So, we don’t have any
measures three, four, or five in this one. The outcome in deliverables,
a portfolio of alternatives will be, you know, that’s
basically our outcome. An assessment on effectiveness
of each alternative plan using a broad set of evaluation criteria, which we have come up with some criteria. It’s still in draft form. So still a work in progress. But I have a slide on what
we have come up to date. Identification of alternative
plans that perform best and themes, so when we look at
putting these plans together, we may look at water park
deliveries as a theme, operations as a theme,
even we still are coming up with what those themes are going to be but those are a few examples
of what they could be. And, as mentioned before, we’ll provide provide
recommendations unlike a planning study where there’s
only one recommendation, we may have two or three
recommendations to executive. So the evaluation criteria framework, there’s lots of information
out there where they use risk analysis. FERC, FERC, the core of
engineers, USBR, they all do risk analysis, DWR has been
working on risk analysis for some time now as part
of the OMN Asset Management. So, we’re gonna take all
this information and apply it to the CNA. The evaluation criteria that
we’ve come up with so far, and again, this is still a draft, we could delay modify what’s here, and more than likely we
will make some modifications but this is not in any
sequential order of importance, these are just items that
we’ve come up to date. So, first and foremost is
protect public and worker safety. We need to obviously comply
with FERC, the SOD regulations, make and improve operational
flexibility and reliability, follow conventional design
and construction approaches, require conventional OMN activities. We want to make sure that
whenever we design something we’re going to be able to maintain it. You know, we don’t want
to put a design out there that will prevent us to doing
any maintenance in the future. So, we definitely want to make
sure that it’s maintainable. – On that point, now
you’re taking into account Assemblyman Gallagher’s Dam
Inspection Legislation too? That now is in the books? – [Presenter] Yes. – So that kind of being
an overview governing these things fill into place
consistent with that statute? – [Presenter] Yes. – And on the word
conventional, because you know, we struggle sometimes with making sure we use the right word, we want to makes sure that
we come up with designs that are, you know, easily,
you know, we can operate and maintain but we’re
not gonna go down the road of it’s hard, we’re not doing it. It’s just, making sure we
evaluate that we’re able to do it reliably. There are some designs
that are hard to maintain but if that’s the design
that we need to go with then we’re gonna figure out
ways to maintain it properly. But, we’re also gonna be
looking at that aspect of all designs. – Thanks Joel. – The next one is navigate
permitting issues successfully. When we presented this
information to the IRB, one of the comments that
they had on this slide was make sure that you
could get permitting easily. So, we’ve incorporated that. Assures water and power delivery, implements plan in a
timely matter, so you know, if there’s a plan out there
that’s gonna take 20 years to implement and there’s a
better plan that it’ll take five years, then we’re gonna
go for the one that’s easier to implement. Minimize total cost, you
know, construction, O&M, failure to perform, opportunity cost. Achieves robustness,
redundancy, resourcefulness, rapidity, and resiliency. These are comments that the IRB made at the first IRB meeting. – Mr. Sergio, now that you’ve
got the IRB’s making comments on this criteria and this
is an area, you know, as the ad hoc group
looks at this criteria, I would be interested if
you’re seeing, you know, if this covers what you
think should be looked at, or if you have other things
that you’re concerned about that should be considered
as well that would be good feedback. – Well, I know we’re just looking
at this for the first time right now, so, are you looking
for some feedback right now? – No, yes, if you had it. But also, I think we had
talked about four weeks or so was the window we were expecting. So, definitely as you guys
look at this and think about it or as we’re going through the
process as things come up. – Any members, do you have any
thoughts just looking at some of this criteria right now? – Yeah, just one observation
is that recreation, ’cause that’s what I’m watching out for, is interwoven into both
the regulatory requirements and public benefits because
some of the recreation mitigation is obligation of the license. So, wanna be sure that’s
interwoven in there, both as a license obligation
as well as a public benefit. – Well, with respect to
the license obligations, the CNA is not part of
the license operations. However, the last bullet
there, provides other public benefits, you know, if
there’s a secondary benefit from any of these plans that
would benefit a recreation, you know, that’s another benefit. – Yeah, but the point I was
making is that recreation mitigation is an
obligation of the license. So, it has to be taken into
account under that part as well as the, maybe
subjective, public benefit part. – If it’s a mitigation of the license, we are not going to do something
that’s detrimental to that. But I guess, my point was that
we are not going to implement mitigations that are required
by the license as part of the CNA. – Hey, Sergio, can I just? I think the point you’re
making is also correct. I mean, the fact that
when we say the executive is going to make decisions,
we’re gonna come up with our recommendations that
are going to FERC and DSO. So we’re not alone. We don’t get to make the
decisions by ourselves. We’ve got to get it approved by FERC. FERC because they’re managing
the dam safety portion of it but also the licensing
side is going to make sure that we’re complying with our
license on the recreation. So they believe or we
believe there’s mitigation on the recreation side, FERC
is gonna weigh in on that and either direct us or,
you know, make sure we don’t go against our license. So I think it’s included
in the FERC process that we’re gonna be making sure we meet our recreation needs. – Ron, I think this is an
example of tension that we have about a Comprehensive Needs Assessment. I think many of us think that
perhaps have a more expansive view of what the Comprehensive
Needs Assessment should be. And it seems to me that
clearly recreation in or around the dam complex is an issue and what’s in the license is
perhaps what’s in the license, what’s in the relicense
license is in the license. But you may, as part of the
Comprehensive Needs Assessment, come up with ideas to add or
revise the recreation plan in the license. Therefore, it may be a
FERC licensing issue, but it’s still a proposal
that could come out of a Comprehensive Needs Assessment and then be incorporated into the license. So I think we have, we’re still struggling I
think with understanding your conception of what the
Comprehensive Needs Assessment will cover and how that
sorts out with our conception of it as well as how we work through this. – All right, so I think
maybe would be it correct maybe to summarize that
as maybe a criteria could be impacts to recreation? Is that what you’re getting at, Larry? – [Larry] Yeah, from both a regulatory and a public benefits aspect, yes. – And you know, I think that’s
one of the comments, right? – If I may– – Yeah, go ahead Bill. – I know, I think here we go again. You can’t hold everything
separate because the conclusions you’re going to come to are
in some way are going to alter the operations of the dam
with climate change and lack of a lower spillway and all that. And that’s gonna impact recreation
from one end to the other ’cause if the lakes are lower
for longer periods of time it changes everything in the relicensing, pending what licensing agreement, and everything going forward. So again, you can’t just box that out. I think Mr. Growman’s entirely right. Ron, you’re bouncing around it. The fact is, you can’t just
can’t put it down there provides for other public benefits. It will directly impact my
community and our future. – Can I just add ’cause I know
this is a complicated issue and I know we’ve talked about
it and the CNA could get super complex and big really quickly. But, this process of studies
and really, it’s to come up with concepts and studies
that are gonna go forward with actual designs and plans. And I think that level, at
that point, is I think where we can probably be able to
address more of the actual recs, especially when we talk about
the operations of the dam. If you see the tasks we’re going forward, that’s going to happen
through the core of engineers and most likely will be
after we’ve come up with our concepts on the facility and said we’re building another spillway, we’re doing this, we’re doing that. That’s gonna go over to that
world and then they’re gonna start working out. So the recreational changes
that come out of a new operation plan will get handled there. I think when we agree with
FERC and you guys on what the concepts or the projects
are coming out of this, I think we can dive a lot
deeper into the recreation. I just don’t think at this
phase we’re gonna be able to really get to that level, yet. But Larry, we’re not
gonna discount recreation. I think that’s very important
to the State Water Project and Oroville itself. – I don’t think anybody’s
saying we need to dive down deep and do exactly how that
impacts recreation, right? I think it’s just saying that maybe part of the evaluation criteria is like hey, how would this particular
recommendation that’s being made potentially impact recreation? – [Joel] Okay, no that’s fair enough. – Instead of just saying
other public benefits. I mean, look, it’s not lost
on anybody that water delivery is up there three times. You know, it’s not lost on
me that flood control doesn’t appear on there at all. You know, I mean there’s things
on there that are obviously seem to be more priorities than
others and we’re just saying hey look, when you consider, you know, these aren’t the finals,
these are the planning stage, I agree, but in the planning
stage, you go oh okay, well, if we recommend
going forward with X, what are, you know, the different
things that could happen as a result of us moving
in that direction, right? – Fair enough. If we know of a rec issue
at the point we’re pointing these together we should
evaluate it at this time. – And on first blush,
I would say number one, combining protects public
and worker safety into one bullet point, I think you
need to separate those out. I mean, I almost say
maximize the public safety would be number one. Because there’s a difference
between the general public that’s protected by this
dam and then there’s people that work on this dam everyday, right, that need to be safe, right? And how they interact with
the operations and maintenance of the facility that are safe. I mean, so, I would split those out. I mean, this is just
first blush stuff, man. We’ve all just seen this right now. But, if that’s gonna be
the criteria, I mean, this is, I think that’s the
point in having this group so that we can go hey man
here, did you think about this? And did you think about maybe
these things in terms of how we’re gonna, ’cause this is a key thing, right? This is how we’re gonna
evaluate different proposals that come up in the tasks. And if something’s not in
there, then it might not be accounted for, right? I agree with you, completely,
Joel, that we’re not going to figure this out exactly
what the specific recreational component might be or the
specific flood control component or we’re not gonna
do the manual right here, (chuckles), right, for example. But, we are gonna try to
inform that process, right? And try to say hey, this is
what we would like it to be. – So those are good points. I think when they come in, we’ll– – [Assemblyman] They’ll, yeah. – I think what we’re trying to say is, we’re to trying to tell
you how to plan all this impacts out, just acknowledge
there will be other impacts. And I totally agree in my
notes here that public safety should be first. I think that should be,
if you want to buy in, if you want buy in from the
public, then you’re going to have to put protects public
safety as your number one bullet because the perception
of the public is now, bluntly, we’re more worried
about water delivery than public safety or power
generation than public safety. So, I agree with Congressman
fully on that second point. Thank you. (everyone agreeing) – You’re almost my
Congressman, sorry Doug. (everyone chuckling) – No, good points. And we’ll take that into account. And number one happened to be number one, public safety is number one. – Well thank you. – I just want to say that
one of the reasons I know that Larry is bringing this
up and Bill and the people that live here in Oroville particularly, in Butte County in general, that we really need to
see the word recreation in these documents because
recreation has been, hasn’t had an equal seat
at the table on discussions in the past and it’s really
impact so much of our economic viability here and it’s so
important that I would like to see it. I agree with Larry, someway
stated, in the evaluation criteria that how does
these changes proposed affect recreation? – [Joel] Okay. – I think it’s really
important that we get that word elevated and we get
recreation at the table moving forward.
– And again, clarifying that we’re not saying that this
is going to plan recreational facilities for the dam.
– [Laura] Correct. – Everybody knows that, right? It’s just, what we do with
the actual infrastructure could impact the recreational
benefits of the lake. And so that’s just something
that should be at least considered.
– Well taken. – Thank you for those good comments. – Let me ask another question. We’re focused on the
dam, the dam operation, but you’re taking into
account as well, aren’t you, the deliverability of the
whole State Water Project? Now that includes levies and
bypasses and other matters that relate to the delivery
of water through the system. – I think as we mentioned last time, the downstream of the dam, now
we’re getting into the flood control manual and those operations, we have John here that’s more, he’s a lot more knowledgeable than I am when it comes to that. – I just want to make that
point that sometimes people don’t think about that part. I’ve said, for example,
the need to fix the levies and our arguments in the
budget to get the money for the levies that you
know, you don’t need a dam if you don’t have a delivery system. So that’s, they’re integrated in length. – And we’re all looking forward to Mr. Lehey’s presentation, so yeah. Okay, on that note moving forward. (everyone chuckling) So, this table is, was
typical in a risk analysis where you have a likelihood
and consequences, likelihood of the left,
consequences on the bottom there. So, the oval shape A has
a very low likelihood and similarly low consequence. Part of the reason why
we shoe it as an oval instead of a dot is because
through this process we’re going to be doing a
semi-quantitative risk analysis. We’re not going to do a
quantitative risk analysis. The quantitative risk analysis, those are done once you’re
actually getting into the design efforts. So, at this stage, we’re not,
we’re not, at that level. So, we’re not showing a dot
instead we’re showing an oval. Bubble B there shows a
fairly low likelihood but the consequence is
very high, catastrophic. So, this would be an inferior plan and so there are different
ways to mitigate that. If this plan had any, say, deliveries or, let me step back. A way to mitigate that
would be to maybe modify the operations of the facility, start releasing water earlier, there’s other ways to
mitigate for that bubble that’s in red and move it to
the yellow or to the green. So, when we’re evaluating these plans, we’re gonna look at all that. The goal is to be in the green. If we’re not in the green,
be in the yellow at minimum. This chart on the right kind
of shows how we’re comparing the without plan or baseline
condition to three different work plans. So with work plan one, whatever
measures are implemented, it’s gonna be superior
to what’s out there now. Whereas, with the second
work plan, with the measures that would be recommended or implemented would actually be detrimental
to the existing conditions. So that would be an inferior plan. Work plan three has the greatest benefit. So it moves further to the right. So the outcome, as mentioned
before, there’s gonna be recommendation plans that
are gonna be presented to management. It’s not gonna be a single recommendation. It’s gonna be two, three, four. We still don’t know yet. But, there will be more
than one recommendation. Also as mentioned at our last meeting, there’s gonna be some projects out there that we could start implementing earlier, some that would have
significant benefit immediately. So, we would definitely start the process with the regulators to get
those projects implemented. Here’s the new work plan,
the item in green there, that’s the Part 12D
Level Two Risk Analysis. That’s gonna start in January
of next year and it’s gonna go through approximately
the first week of March. So as a result of that
and our restructuring of the project, bringing
in an integration team and doing all this other work,
our schedule has extended out five months. – Are we good with that
Assemblyman and Senator because we had to include
the Part 12D portion of the risk assessment. After doing that, that’s
really what’s pushing out the schedule because we had
been saying we would be done by the end of next year
but including that work, it pushes it out five months
to be done with that piece and then the rest of it. I just want to make sure of that. – I mean, yeah, I get what you’re saying. I guess I probably want
to know a little bit more about how that Part 12D
function interacts with this a little bit. I mean, again, it’s like
we’re just kind of learning about this right now, so. – [Joel] Yeah, I just
wanted to mention that. – I understand that it’s
like another task, you know. You know, additional work,
that you have to do, right, so. – [Joel] Okay. – So obviously that, you know, um… – So with that– – I don’t have any objections
to matters (chuckling). – No, I just wanted to make sure it was understood because– – Right. – Because as our new
schedule starts going out and it shows later than the end of 2019, it was clear, at least
from our perspective, why it happened. It wasn’t just us delaying
or pushing the project back. – Do you envision us needing
to have more meetings? ‘Cause I know our schedule
ran us through the end of ’19. – John’s saying yes.
– Saying another meeting or two?
– I’d expect to. Two more. – Yeah, I foresee at
least two more meetings. – On top of what we agreed upon. – As a result of that shift. – What’s important is
the communication to us about what’s going on. We can like it or not but if
we don’t even know about it then, and things are prolonged,
then what’s going on here? So, the heads up is very helpful. – And part of me also,
Joel, is wanting to, ’cause we have a lot of material to cover. – Yeah. – I think maybe we can talk
a little bit more offline about that but I want to keep
us moving into the bulk– – [Joel] No, I understand. – Yes, question on the schedule? – Yes. – So, I need the microphone. Last time we talked about
schedule and if things take longer than you anticipated,
the question was do we go for the schedule or
do we go for the quality? And you guys gave the
assurance that we were gonna go for the quality end. I’m looking back at the
work plan that you had and phase three was formulate plan, that was scheduled to be
wrapped up October 31st, which is tomorrow. When I look at your current schedule, that’s been pushed off quite a ways and the Level Two Risk Analysis
isn’t scheduled to start up until January. So I’m not sure that that
impacted the early portion of the schedule. The other thing that I see on
your future looking schedule is you have very short
durations for all these tasks. It’s like one month for a number of those things. And I think what we’ve seen
to date is things are taking longer than you think. So, if we’re now in quarter one of 2020, how confident are you
that we’re gonna stay 2020 and have that high level
low quality or do you think we’re looking really at the end of 2020, like quarter four 2020, to
get the quality to do all these things within the narrow
confine that you’ve denoted? – Well, based on the information we have, we think that the schedule
is a good schedule. The different tasks, they have been working
on measures to date, what’s part of the shift,
again, it has to do with the shifting or the
restructuring of the project. And, obviously the Part 12D
does play a role into it. So the Part 12D is
going to inform the CNA. So, with respect to the
overall schedule, we think that that will work. If it starts slipping,
obviously we’re gonna share that with you, we’re not
gonna, at the last minute, say well, shift six months. But, based on the information
that we have today, this is the schedule for now. – Sure, I just want to highlight
the schedule challenges and make sure we’re
striving for the quality and if things are gonna
take a little bit longer that they’re gonna take
a little bit longer. – And, I appreciate your
comment ’cause I do recall that you made that comment last time. So, we’re not gonna have
quality suffer just to meet a schedule. I think, you know, our goal
is to have the best product out there. – Thank you. – One other comment on that schedule. I think this group has a
lot of desire to have input during the phase two section
and take three (page rustling) and yet those are so
stacked on top of each other that the quarterly meeting
may not be sufficient and may not be open to
additional meetings to make sure that we have ample opportunity
to comment on the phase two phase three piece than wait in the quarter and just hear your recommendations. So I’d be open to additional
meetings during that stretch of the process. – I think that that’s a
good question to submit. – Okay– – A little bit–
– Thank you Sergio. – A little bit behind schedule
so we should be mindful of that. – [John] So goodmorn, let’s see, is it on? Good morning, everyone. – [Gentleman] It’s not for
us, it’s for the camera guys. – Okay, thank you for that clarification. So my name’s John Lehey, I am
the Water Operations Manager for State Water Project, Water Operations. And, you know, we are pressed for time. You know, if there’s not much
interest for the particular topic we can just skip it. (everyone chuckling) So, what I would like to do is go ahead, certainly we’re gonna talk
about the water operations piece as it relates to the CNA process. But, this is also an
opportunity to really bring in the other flood management
activities that are going on and will be going on over the years and that includes the water
control manual update, which is under the US Army
Core of Engineers’ authority, but also I’d like to take the opportunity to walk you through what
is the more immediate plans for flood operations as we
get into this first winter as part of the recovery process. So let me start with that. So this is the 2018 2019
Winter Operations Plan or Flood Operations Plan
and so what we need to do is to take into account what
is the status of the spillways right now and that’s, of
course, what we had to do last winter when we had a plan
out where we had to restrict the elevation of the lake
because of the fact we had this interim designed for the spillway, for the primary spillway, now we’re in a place
where we’re in good shape on the primary spillway,
we have that last concrete was placed ahead of
schedule a couple weeks ago, we’ve still got some curing time on that, but it’s look like December
1st we’ll be back in business in terms of the primary spillway. But, what we had put
together as part of our plan is we need to, before
that primary spillway became functional, we
needed to take precautions and we had a plan in place,
we do have a plan in place, to moderate any storage
gains up until the point that that primary spillway is functional. So that was one aspect of
the plan for this winter. The second aspect, is very
important, is the emergency spillway enhancements are ongoing. That work is going to be
continuing as we go through the winter period here. I’ve got the RCC. RCC has a longer curing
period that will extend through the winter into the spring, there’s some construction,
choice, some structural concrete that needs to be placed as
well on that emergency spillway and that’s not happening until the spring. So we have to put in, we have to also have some
further enhanced flood pool for this season as well. It won’t be to the extent as last winter, but we do need to ensure that
we can continue to be able to manage the standard project flood for which the federal government
invested in originally to protect the downstream. And so, we want to be able to
manage that standard project flood without to ensure we don’t
use the emergency spillway. So, under the existing
Flood Control Manual, there are some routings. Because we have a shared downstream responsibility with Uva County Winery out of New Bullards Bar, there the existing Water Control Manual made some assumptions in it as far as the construction
of Marysville Dam. Okay, it was authorized for
construction but was never built and so under some of the routings between the two reservoirs,
it did require the surcharge of Lake Oroville under some circumstances and in order to pass the
standard project flood. And so, what we’re gonna
put in the place this year is an enhanced flood pool
that will allow us to not have to surcharge but still
meet all of those downstream targets downstream with
our joint operations with Uva County. So, I’m gonna show you a
graphic of that here shortly and yeah, so essentially
those are the two primary components for this plan. So this here is just
the first part of that and this was, this would
be the trigger elevations that we have in place
between now and December 1st when the primary spillway
will be back in business. And so, you can see that we had, the reservoir had been
brought down to below 700 foot elevation, we’re actually
down I think about 693 today. But, we’ve got these restrictions
in place until we hit December 1st and that
would take us to the bottom of the enhanced flood pool
that I’m gonna show you here in a second. And again, this was a
precaution until we actually have that primary spillway function, which is December 1st. Now, here is a depiction of the existing Water Control Manual. The Core’s Manual from 1970. You can see here that, what’s
shown here is two flood pools where we need to provide
vacated space in the reservoir for those very large
events that would occur in the winter period. And the degree of the, the
volume of that vacant space, if you will, the flood
pool, is dependent upon how much rain and snow
we received in the basin in any given year. So, it’s also referred
to as the Wetness Index. So, you can see the curve
on the top that comes down to about elevation 876 or so, that would be the requirement
under a drier winter where the soil moisture is
very low and the water basin would absorb those big
rain events as they came into the system. Now, as if you’re in a
wetter season, a wetter year, then you would expect
a much greater response from the same amount of precipitation, you see greater runoff because the soil’s already
completely saturated, there’s a good deal of
snow packed on the basin then you would expect
a much bigger response as far as inflow into the lake. And so under those conditions, you see a Wetness Index of 11. Then we need to provide
a much greater flood pool down to elevation 848.5, okay. So that’s under the existing rules. Now, what we’re gonna put in
place for this year though is an enhancement on those
existing rules and so this is to ensure that the emergency spillway would not be activated under
a standard project flood. So this is additional
space that we’re provided for this year because of the status of the emergency spillway. And so you can see now,
we’re gonna come down to, right now the plan is still
DRAFT, but it’s looking like about 835 and a half feet. So essentially what we
did was we sized the pools to be able to pass the
standard project flood, still meet all of the release criteria that’s in the flood manual, and not activate that emergency spillway. So that was the criteria
that was used to develop these curves. And you can see we also
have a draw down for the dry water shed condition as well. The standard project flood,
or standard project storm doesn’t produce as much of
a flood flow under dry basin conditions and so the
draw down is not as much for the dry conditions. Now, there is a series of, now you see a wetness index
of 3.5 and there’s one of 11. What I don’t show here is
there is a series of various levels in between those
two and so you can see the enhanced flood pool that
we have will gradually increase as we get wetter and wetter basin. So task two, the task two,
the operations portion just related to the CNA Project
as we’ve defined it here is the operations component
would be used to compare the various CNA
infrastructural alternatives to operations with and without those infrastructural improvements. So, in comparial baseline
will be established. These comparisons will form
the alternative rankings as kind of Sergio went
thorough that process based on operational metrics. So for example, flood
operations, water supply, elevation related to what
would be related to recreation. So those would be operational
metrics that would be evaluated in part of those comparisons. And then, what comes
out of the CNA process as far as the new infrastructure
would certainly then be rolled into a new, an update
to the water control manual. So whatever new outflow
features might come about as a result of the CNA process, they would certainly need
to be rolled into any new flood control roles
that the core would develop. So, that would be one of
many additional improvements, enhancements if you will,
as part of an update to the Water Control Manual. So we see this as being
a multi-year activity and it would extend
beyond this CNA process and has to take into account,
again, any new infrastructural changes that would occur
as part of the CNA. When we anticipated that the
core would also, of course, look at well, we have an
updated hydrologic records since 1970, we have the big
events that have occurred since then that would help
inform an update to that manual. They’re required to take a
look at climate change effects as part of that process. We also have the forecast
informed operations. So we’ve currently been
engaged with both Uva County and The Core over the last
10 years in what we called The Forecasted Coordinated
Operations which was really just improving the communications
between the two agencies and downstream going
through on a yearly basis we will go through functional
and operational exercises. We have developed new
decision support tools that are jointly used by
both projects and The Core in the Division of Flood
Management within the department. So this has been an ongoing effort. Now what we want to do
is take it a step further into this forecast informed
operations approach. So we’re starting a new program there. The Core has been involved
in very formal informed forecast operations
programs at Lake Mendocino and other places and some
of you may be familiar with the term FIRO, Forecast
Informed Reservoir Operations. They formally adopted that. They’re actually considering
Lake Oroville and Uva County as likely candidates for the next round of that FIRO type program. So, forecast informed operations
is something that can also possibly be formally
introduced in the updated Water Control Manual as well. They’d certainly have to
take a risk assessment of the assumptions for
downstream requirements as part of that update to
the Water Control Manual. And certainly as I said,
we’d be coordinating with partner agencies. And in particular, would be Uva County. And so they’re looking to
update their manual as well and so that, it would only
make sense that that would be a joint effort to some
extent because of the common downstream control
points that both projects are responsible for. So a lot of these components
would really go into the eventual update of
that water control manual. And so that’s all I had. Opening up for questions. – Thanks John, just starting
off, this is an issue I brought up quite a bit,
but going back to your graph there where you showed the
difference in the flood pool for this year? – [John] Yes. – In order to operate this project safely, that’s the key thing, you know, this is a
water delivery project. It’s a water delivery
project for the entire state. But in order to operate it
safely, that current black line does not work. And I will give you the ex, here’s the three examples:
1986, 1997, and 2017. That flood curve doesn’t, and in ’97 we had to go
beyond our 150 thousand CSF out of the spillway in
order to avoid getting into emergency spillway and we
know what happened in 2017. In ’86, we used all of
that 150 thousand to avoid going to emergency spillway. It just seems to me and
it seems to everybody that looks at this from just
a common sense standpoint that we don’t have as
much of a safe space there as we need especially when
we have high snow pack and we have a lot of snow pack. And so, my question is this, you know, doing a full update of the
water manual is like you said, a multi-year process, takes a long time. But you’ve been able to
do a modification here, now be it under these
circumstances that we’ve had, but you’ve been able to do a
modification that allows for safer operation, you know,
giving ourselves a better buffer. Why can’t we just go and make
that a permanent part of, make that modification permanent? Or some form of that
which might be a much, might be a less, burdensome process as doing
a full update is gonna be but takes care of what I think
is really the primary issue at Oroville is that the bottom
line is we have way too much water that comes in here
basically about every 10 years and we can’t hold it essentially. And we end up either, you know, exceeding the 150 thousand
CFS out of the flood control outlet or we go to emergency spillway. Either option is not very good, right? – Yeah–
– So talk to me a little bit about that. – And, you know, and so we
absolutely realized, of course, this year that we’re not
gonna wait for a formal update to the Water Control Manual
to make the changes– – Right, we wouldn’t be doing
that unless it was at least in somewhat a part of an
admission that what we have right now is not good, it doesn’t work. – It certainly takes
into account the status of the spillways, absolutely. And–
– But would you also say that what we have
right now doesn’t work? I mean, just the status quo. – [John] I don’t know if I could say that. – Even after experiencing
those events you would say we’re okay? – I think the Water Control
Manual is in need of update. I will say that, yes. – Right, but doing a full
update and everything that goes into that, which is not just this, it’s a lot of other stuff, right? – [John] Right, right. – Is gonna take years and
we’re gonna have all kinds of, the process that it takes, I mean, we’ll be here 10
years, 20 years from now before that’s finally done, right? In the meantime, we
could have other events. That’s what’s concerning to me. And if there’s an easier way
to do what you’ve already done the last two years, which is
look, we need more space there in order to operate this safely when we have these kind
of big water events that we just know are gonna happen. We know they’re gonna happen. It’s a matter of time. You know, I mean, in my lifetime
it’s been every 10 years it happens and we act like
oh my God, this is happening again, you know, I mean, to me that is a, why can’t we deal with that
in a more efficacious way? – Well we, and we have
worked with The Core on this particular plan and we will
continue to work with The Core in the interim up until
Water Control Manual– (men muttering) – Yeah, go ahead Cory. – Sherif? – Your honor, we got you too. – So, um, obviously I share
some of McGallagher’s concerns about public safety and
whether or not there is enough capacity within the reservoir
to accommodate these bigger weather events. I’m interested, and I
don’t think this is the, I don’t want to delay
this meeting any farther or go too deep into the analysis, but I would like, perhaps,
an opportunity to sit down and speak with you and
have a better understanding of how you came to that
increased capacity. You know, what was the analysis
process that got there. Going to some of Gallagher’s
point is that a sufficient amount, is that enough? And I also recognize and
understand the importance of balancing the competing
interest of preserving water. I don’t like the idea of
sending water that we need for other purposes like
agriculture and recreation down stream, but I also want
to make sure that there’s enough capacity in the
reservoir that we don’t get into a situation like we were here, it seems to be every 10 years. So perhaps, we could get
together at some other point and I could get a better
understand of that. I would feel more comfortable,
with that understanding, more comfortable in terms of
managing emergency situations in collaboration with DWR but perhaps also being able to advocate
for a more expedient and permanent solution
in terms of where we are in terms of what the capacity would be. – Okay, there are a couple
of looming factors here too that I think we must account for. One is the impact of
fires on the water shed and the absorbing capacity
and how much runoff we’re gonna get because of the fires. And also, the Water Resources
Control Board is considering streams of those standards and it’s applied in
the Silicon Valley now, it’s been very controversial. It’d be controversial up here too. But that’s something that we’re gonna have to contend with also. Let’s get to Ron, he had something. – I’m gonna give John an
easier time (chuckles). I really always enjoy your presentations because they’re informative
and I don’t feel alone. You and I both, one of the
few people in the world who’ve actually read
the Flood Control Manual and you’ve read it more than I have. And I appreciate the
department’s creativity in saying look, we’re going
to have a flood operation regime, a temporary
flood operation regime, that will give us the
same kind of protection that the flood manual
was designed to give us. Now, we haven’t always
achieved that in the past but at least that’s an inspirational goal and I commend the department
for recognizing that. The question I have, or maybe it’s just posing this publicly, is that I had the chance to
review a letter that FERC sent the department noting
that probable maximum flood estimate is higher than the
spillway design and that the department should reclassify
the emergency spillway as an auxiliary spillway,
which presumably means that FERC is less tolerant
of having a lot of damage and havoc occur when that
emergency spillway is used. So, I think, um, as a practical matter, if public safety is
the number one priority of the department’s
operations at Oroville, until you have an emergency
spillway that would um, not cause a lot of havoc if it’s used, you’re gonna have to have
these interim draw downs of the reservoir more than
perhaps we would like but it, there may be no alternative. So, as the department
looks at attempting to um, meet the standard, if
the problem maximum flood has been expanded, the
standard project flood is often scaled to that hypothetical flood. They’re both hypothetical. Worst case floods for various purposes. The standard project flood
for flood water management. So, does the department expect
that it will continue to want to manage for a
standard project flood even if the standard project
flood estimate increases? – So okay, so there’s a
number of questions there. – I like that. (everyone laughing) – So first of all, on the
designation of the OG spillway as to is it auxiliary, is it emergency? Quite frankly, I don’t really
care what you want to call it. I know what it’s functions
are and what we need to know what its capabilities are
and how does that interplay with what we’re trying to achieve in terms of the flood protections. So I don’t know what the
implications are exactly on FERC’s, what FERC is mulling over in terms of the naming conventions. – You just got the letter, so– – Yeah, right. So that’s one aspect. As far as the standard project flood, that’s certainly something that
the core’s gonna be looking at as part of this update on
how they’re actually gonna establish that level of flood protection. Now, my understanding with the existing, the existing standard project flood was, was developed first. And the probable maximum
flood was scaled up from that standard project flood
for the original one. They made some other
modifications to that scaling, I think they shortened some
of the lag times and what have you for that probable maximum flood. So it was actually scaled off
of the standard project flood in the original, for the
original PMF that was developed. And so, the new one was
a different technique than what was the original. So that’s kind of where we are there. I don’t know if I got all your questions– – Well, I guess–
– As far as moving forward? – As a policy, do you
want to continue operate to have a facility with
both an operations manual as well as physical
facilities that can control the standard project flood
of the 1960’s or 2020’s? – [John] I think– – That’s the question that I
think the department faces. – I think there’s no
doubt that the, you know, the metric of flood protection
that’s being used currently, which is a standard project
flood, that will change. And undoubtedly, I mean I can’t, you know, sit here and tell you exactly
how it will change in terms because the core’s gonna
ultimately make that decision, but I would anticipate
they’re gonna be looking at, if they’re looking at
climate change effects, what have you, they’d
be looking at something, I wouldn’t be surprised if
it’s something greater than the standard project flood
in terms of what types of flood protection they’re
looking at moving forward and that’s why it’s gonna be
important in terms of these additional facilities that
may be going online as well for that management. But ultimately, they have
the authority on that. We are definitely gonna
work very closely with them and some of the expertise
we have and we can bring to the table to help with that. But ultimately, it will be their decision. – And the department’s
recommendation, and I’ll just close recognizing we are out of
time, but it just seemed that this is gonna be a big
issue and this is, you know, gonna be one of the major
issues that the CNA is gonna have to confront. And I hope that the
department and the core and this community can feel
that it’s been done well. – [Male] Can I? – What’s the plan? I mean, and I’m sorry man,
but like okay, we’ve heard about the interim operation
which I get that’s important, but, we’re here about the long term. Like so, task two as my
understanding is hey, here’s our plan, here’s what
we’re gonna come up with as our plan for how we want
to do the water manual, among other things, and how we, you know, how we
do water operations, right? So, just saying well, it’s
up to the core and man, the core’s just gonna,
no, we are going into this obviously with a strategy
of how we would like this to be done, right? I don’t think that we’re just
leaving it up to somebody else to decide, I mean to me, this
is one of the biggest issues. It’s the biggest issue
that affects the community every 10 years, you know? Is how that is operated when
we have, you know, 110% snow pack up above the dam and,
you know, and under this thing it’s at 850 feet. – How we redesign the physical facilities so they can operate better. – Right. And so, what I want to know
from DWR is so what is the plan on task two? What is your plan going into that? And again, my question wasn’t answered. Is there another way of going
about this other than just a full Water Control Manual update? I mean, we’ve obviously
done an interim change. Like, is there a way to
go, you know, making those, just a modification to the
update, rather than doing a full update of the water manual? ‘Cause I don’t, really I
think that’s what we need is right up there on the
graph is we need something that really gives us, it’s not a flood control
versus water delivery issue. It’s not at all. It is this is a water delivery project, but in order for that
water delivery project to operate safely, this has got to be, this situation right here
can’t continue, you know? I mean, so, that’s my question. What is this strategy? How are you guys gonna approach this in the Water Control Plan update? – So this is very important to us. And so I don’t know if you
guys remember the governor sent the letter to the
core kinda asking them to, if we could expedite and
put appropriate funding so we could get started
on this as an expedited. We’re getting ready to
probably reach out again and we may be reaching out
to some of you to help us, but we want to get them on board today. We need to get going on this plan and– – Okay, so if they get on board, what do you want to suggest to them? What are you gonna say
this is what we should do? – No, I think we need to
reevaluate with the hydrologists and everybody else what
is the right flood control and preferably we would have
it, we could know that before next winter so we can implement
whatever we need to do for public safety by then. I don’t think we’re saying
we want to wait 10 years. – Right–
– We’re not doing that. – And if you’re waiting on the core– – No, we need them, right? – I’m not, in the flood control
world, we said we’re not gonna wait on the core, right? And we did 1E and we
started building the levies in advance, you know? We said we’re not gonna just sit around and wait for the core, right? – Yeah, we’re not gonna wait–
– And we’re definitely not gonna do it on this.
– But we need the core. – Right.
– We’re not gonna wait for the core, but we need the core. And so, we’re gonna
pound on their door again wanting them to fund because
they need to be funded through Congress to be able
to take on this activity with us in Uva County. So, we’re gonna be pushing on them. We may reach out to some
of you for help and– – It was pointed out to
me just a moment ago, would be best to have the
core at one of our future meetings here since
there’s so instrumental in this decision making? – [Joel] I mean we can. – Having a representative,
someone in the room, that can be apart of– – The more important thing
to me, Joel, is I understand that we need the core and
the core’s gonna, you know, you have to go through them
to do this work, right? I get that. What I’m saying is we want
to be part of the strategy of how we’re going about doing that. What’s the plan? What’s the game plan? And I want to help inform that. – [Joel] Yeah, so I agree. – In terms of how it should be, and honestly, I think, in
talking to a lot of people, there’s a lot of concern
about just doing a full blown Water Control Plan update
because people think that’s gonna get bogged down with all
kinds of different things and by the time we’re done,
it might not even be something any of us like, right? Whereas, the real problem is right there. I mean, the real problem is
what happens in the winter every 10 years, again, and
how do we hone in on that and take care of that problem. Maybe there’s a more streamline process. I don’t know. That’s why I’m asking you
guys (chuckles) you know, to do that? – From my perspective, we need to do both. So we need to look at the long term fix. And I think one thing we’ve
been talking about with the core because it is such a long process, whatever we come up with
needs to be a flexible plan, needs to be able to adapt
to changes as they occur. So I think that’s part of,
as far as a robust solution, eventually, but I also think
you’re absolutely right. We can’t wait for that. We need to have these
interim steps, you know, to keep the public
safety before that time. And I think this has been
a good opportunity to use this forum, because we’re getting some
really great input here, so I can see we’re gonna
continue to utilize this forum for these types of discussions. Now I think, perhaps at some
point that the core’s process will take over, but I can see
where this process perhaps fills that gap in talking
about these interim measures. So I think this is a good opportunity for this particular poll. – [Assemblyman] Yeah, Ron. – Let me just, um, perhaps
for information purposes, the interim plan that you
have, you implemented last year and you’re proposing for this
year is within the authority of the department to implement
without core’s permission. You have the authority
to essentially dig into the conservation pool
and create a temporary flood reservation for
year to year, you know, if in the department’s judgment
that’s what has to happen because the emergency
spillway isn’t safe to use. So, you need the core if
you intend to do forecast operations that will
conditionally store water in what’s currently the
core’s flood reservation. That’s something that you
can’t violate without a change in the manual. So, to escuage Assemblyman
Gallagher’s concerns, we have and you have, we
collectively, have the ability to make the operations at
Oroville safe in this interim time before the emergency
spillway is safe to use and there’s various
definitions of safe to use. But ultimately, I think if
you’re going to have the kind of operation you want,
fully coordinated with the Uva County Water Operations
and using some potentially storage end of the flood pool
on the condition that you release it when a flood is
coming, you’re gonna need the core. And also, it’s really critical
what the infrastructure is if the infrastructure at the dam remains, infrastructure that
sometimes causes havoc during large flood operations, that’s
gonna limit what the core will let you do. And so, the department’s
decisions and FERC’s decisions done even in a dam safety
context are going to have an impact on what the flood
manual can let you do. So this becomes a very
integrated dam safety flood water management project. I’m somewhat heartened to
recognize that the department’s beginning to think about
this pretty seriously. So, we just want to be
involved in your deliberations, we want to understand this
as thoroughly as you do because to some degree,
we’re representatives, we have to explain this
to the public as well. So, you gotta bring us
along so that we understand this really critical issue
and of course this meeting is helpful in doing that. But, we’re gonna have to
have a lot more discussions. – Matt? – Thank you. I think you’ve made a decent
attempt to try and get to a curve that’s gonna handle
the standard project flood. It looks like you reduced it by what, 140 thousand acre feet, the surcharge amount that
was suppose to be there during the previous manual? – [John] It was actually up to
170 thousand on the low end. – And on the high end, 140? – Um, well, the dry curve
is reduced by 37 thousand. The wet curve is reduced by 170 thousand. – So only 37 thousand? – That’s right because
the standard project storm doesn’t produce nearly
the volume of runoff when the basin’s dry. And so, that’s why there’s
a difference between what the project, a difference in
the runoff produced by project, the standard project storm. – Does the 1970 level allow for surcharge? – Um, yes, so that was, that’s
what we’re correcting for. Essentially is that some of
the routings in 1970 manual, depending on the interaction
between the releases from New Bullard’s Bar, it
does depending on the centering of the storm, it does
indicate that surcharging of Lake Oroville would be
necessary under some circumstances in managing that standard project flood. And so that’s the whole
reason for this correction is so that we would not have
to surcharge the lake during, and still be able to safely pass that– – During the standard project flood? – [John] Yes. – Okay, the FERC memo that
was just released to the, you probably haven’t had
a chance to look at yet, is calling for standard project
flood and probable maximum flood projections that
would increase inflows but by quite a bit than
the number, what was it, the 2003 standard project flood
and probable maximum flood. So it may be a good idea for
you to pause on this plan right now until you fully
digest the letter that FERC sent you and that way you
can see if they’re projecting that using Noah’s Atlas
14 Method instead of, what’d you use, the 59 method? – Yeah, they were referencing
the new probable maximum flood which is for the spillway design. – [Matt] Yes. – Yep. – Okay, but so it called
for increases flows. If you look at historical
floods since the time the dam started until the 97,
there’s a 65% upward curve and I don’t think it stops at 97. And yet, you’re still basing this off of storm data that only accounts prior to 97. The Noah’s Atlas 14 accounts up until 2004 and not to be included
just in the longterm plan but the interim plan. So I think you have the
opportunity to sharpen the pencil when it comes to your curves
here if you take this new information into account. That’s comment one. The next is a question for you. With this curve right here,
can you walk us through not the standard project
flood but what the probable maximum flood would look
like on this scenario? – No I can’t do that
standing here right now. I’m sorry about that. – But I think the point,
Matt, one of the things is, that’s an interim. That’s just for this flood
year, for 18-19, right? – Yeah, but– – Yeah, but the long term
is what you’re getting at. The long term, there’s a different– – [Matt] Both. – Okay. – I don’t accept the
curve here for an interim. Because not accounting
for the adjustments that Noah’s Atlas 14 would put
into here and the fact that I don’t see how you’re gonna
handle a probable maximum flood with the current state
of the emergency spillway. – You know, that’s a part of
the charter of the CNA process is exactly that, the task one. – Which is not going to be
completed for another year and a half. In the meantime we have
two more winters we need to get through so we
need to get this right. And, we should not just
be looking at standard but probably maximum floods
in that the infrastructure has to be able to handle that. – So maybe that’s something
that you could get back to us on after this right now? I realize you’re not gonna
be able to answer that right now, John, but I’m just, you know, if that’s maybe something
you can get back to us on trying to look at that, you know? His point, I think, about using the atlas, say that again, sorry,
(chuckles) what’s the word? – [Matt] It’s– – [John] 2004 (chuckle). – Right, I don’t know, I
think is the process that will receive written comments
and look at a response. Is that the process that
we’re looking at here as a part of this? – We can do it that way. – [Assemblyman] Let’s make it a written– – Yeah. – All right. – I apologize, I know that took some time but I just, I think it’s
a pretty important part of all this. – Well, we have a good
block in the afternoon, well not the afternoon, after
the break, is for ad hoc for discussion, and so in
some ways we’re kinda using, we’re having good discussion
here with the presentation. – Right.
– Might be a more effective way, I don’t feel bad about
using this time that way. – Okay, well do you want to
keep just powering through here. Just getting to the next task? – [John] I think so. – Okay. – [John] So next we have our– – Thank you John. – Task three. Who’s up here? – Feel free to grab one as you need. – Okay, once again I’m Dave Circuseen. I’m DWR, Division of
Operations and Maintenance and working on task
three which is entitled Flood Control Outlet Enhanced Reliability. And, this task is a little
unique because we’ve got an existing piece of infrastructure here. A lot of history. A lot of studies have been undertaken so a lot of information available. What is task three? It’s an overall assessment
of the flood control outlet focusing on longterm
reliability of the facility. We’re looking at operating systems and the outlet structure’s
major structural components. So we’re defining it as
the new spillway shoot, the gate structure itself,
the adjacent monoliths which are to the right and the
left of the gated monoliths, and the radial gates themselves. As Sergio laid out earlier,
we’re adopting the steps for each task looking at
identifying objectives, constraints, opportunities, and needs, and that’s
really where we are now. We’re still in that process
of capturing that information. After we do that, we’ll
start identifying measures to address those needs and
I foresee that, step two, occurring shortly after
the Part 12 process in PFMA Level Two Risk Analysis
which is January to March of 2019, so that’s when we’ll
really have a good handle on what needs to be addressed
and what the measures might look like to address those needs. At step three, four, five,
and six, that’s really more at the project level with Sergio
and that integration team. So our objective once again,
enhanced longterm reliability, some constrains that
we gotta keep in mind, it’s an existing structure. We need to take a look at each measure make sure and screen it, evaluate
it, and avoid introducing additional or unintended risks. So a lot of measures we
might identify might say oh, let’s go do this or that,
we gotta step back and look at the structure and really
understand is that gonna help us in the long term or actually
gonna create a problem for us. We also have to keep in mind
that this is in operation, right, this structure
is needed every winter, so whatever measures we develop, we gotta think bout how
achievable are they in the context of flood control and water
delivery and water supply. Structure has 50 years of
service as the IRB recommended, we gotta take a look
at what’s worked well, have we learned from owning
and operating and maintaining the structure over 50 years, let’s hang on to that information. And then also, how can we
better monitor the condition and performance of its
various components over time. And so we’ll take a look at
new technologies, new methods, to really carry us forward into the future with this structure. The past years created some
great opportunity for data collection, a lot of
the things we’ve done, we would not have been able
to do if the spillway shoot was not being reconstructed. And so I wanted to share with
you some things we’ve done. We’ve gotten a look at the
drains that are underneath the flood control outlet
and we are able to do that when we were up at the
uppermost interface between the F-Seal and the shoot. The demolition occurred and
we had contractor hook around and find some of the drains
for us and we got some good video, they looked in good condition. We also did some load testing
of the existing anchors just downstream of the FCO. And you can see the jack
and the set up there, so we got some information
on those anchors in rock, very similar to what’s
underlying the FCO itself. And then when we had the
meeting, the field meeting out there, we saw some
of these guys in action sampling and testing the
concrete and steel of the FCO. And we’re gonna use that
information to really get good handle on the material properties of the reinforced concrete. – Hey Dave, can I just add
it, I mean, since you guys are here too, I just want
to personally thank Dave too because while we were trying
to demolish the upper part of the spillway and we
needed to get going on this, we didn’t want to miss the
opportunity for him and his team to do this collection of
data before we, you know, put new structural concrete. So, you know, that was an
art with trying to coordinate all the work with Q-It and
make sure we didn’t slow them down but make sure we
collected this information that was needed for the
assessments going forward. So Dave, I just want to say
thank you because that was a lot that was a lot of coordination, but man I’m glad you guys
were able to pull that off. – Thank you, there’s a lot of
folks that deserve more credit than I do. So anyways, yeah, it was
really an opportunity. So we really took advantage of it. And we were really mindful
of Q-It’s Operations, we did not want to interrupt construction. We’ve been identifying needs
through ongoing analysis. And some of these are
harking back to Part 12 recommendations from 2014,
especially with respect to the FCO and updating our
analysis on how it’s going to perform during a flood
event, during an earthquake. And so we’ve had some
consultants doing some pretty rigorous analysis thus far
on the structure itself, those are ongoing, and
we plan on bringing those into that PFMA workshop and
showing the results of those to the team and understanding
how that facility performs under these extreme events. We’ve had some surveys of
the Oroville Fields Division engineers, mechanics,
electricians, and operators. These are the people that
are familiar with how this facility operates, how
it’s performed in the past, kind of what issues they’ve
stumbled upon in operating and maintaining the structure. So we want to capture all
that information and make sure it’s on our mind as we look at measures. A number of inspections, I’ve got a slide coming
up addressing that, and then documentation
review and improvement, we have existing manuals and practices. We want to improve those. We want to get to the best
practices in that arena. We also are gonna look at the Operation Orders and Instructions, make sure those capture
all the information that’s necessary to
ensure a safe operation. And then the Level Two Risk
Analysis, as I mentioned bringing all this
information into that process so that we have the best
information available to the team participating. We’ve had quite a bit of work
over the past seven or eight years, we’re gonna leverage that. Back in 2011, we had some
detailed structure reevaluation analysis of the radial
gates, several performed. We’ve had rope access
inspections with the guys on the rope looking at
every connection, the welds, the bolts, the coatings. 2014 we did some more
analysis on the gates. Then 2017, during the emergency,
each time we had a zero flow period of enough duration. We had the rope access guys,
and these are engineers, climbing those gates. I think we did it three times. And that was just part of
verifying we didn’t have any issues with those gates during
those emergency flow periods. Following the emergency in
late 2017, we had a pretty robust maintenance effort
out there on the gates. And then in 2017, 2018
structural analysis, those are in terms of the gated monoliths, the reinforced concrete
structure of those monoliths as well as we had analysis
of the adjacent monoliths that are considered part of the FCO. Recent faulting and seismicity
studies, we’ve once again, over the past five years
in response to Part 12 recommendations we’ve collected
sure way velocity data up there, we’ve had investigations
of faults in the area, so a lot of great information
is coming into our hands really to help, once again, inform the PFMA and risk analysis. Annual gate exercises, we’ve
been doing these every year, and will continue doing them, but collecting that information, seeing what those exercises have told us over the years and balance
checks of the hoist ropes. That’s something that we’ve
been rolling into our annual exercises as well, seeing
how the gates perform as we raise them, as we lower
them, and it helps us detect if there’s any sort of
binding issues occurring. Operating systems and procedures, we’re gonna take a look at
redundancy and resiliency for power sources. We’re gonna look at that
critical operational equipment, their condition, and their
availability of replacement parts so if we have some obsolete
equipment up there, we’re gonna take a look
at, you know, getting new, take a look at the operational procedures for gate operations again and then also stop log
needs and operations. – On the point of the inspections,
I might have missed it here but one of my first
questions when we began to have the problem, I asked
if you’d done over the decade any boring, going down
underneath the spillway to see what’s happened
and the degrading under. And when we saw the brake, you
could see the tremendous void there so any boring going on here? Or what are your plans to
put monitors under there? – Yeah, in fact we wanted to
put in piezometers underneath the FCO, the gated structure,
they installed some under the spillway shoot during
construction, so we’ll be able to monitor poor pressures during flows. In order to avoid messing
with Q-It’s schedule, we basically had to step
back and realize we aren’t gonna get piezometers
installed underneath the FCO this season, but it’s our
intention to get them installed in 2019 and that would yes,
inform us of poor water pressure underneath the FCO, both when
just the lake behind the gates but also during a release. The thing that we really is
gonna need to take some delicate design and thought is how
we can route the cables for the instrumentation
to a point that we can get those measurements and
mindful that we’re in the bay, there’s high velocities with the flows, and we don’t wanna create a risk, right? That’s one of those things
we’re talking about. We’d love to get that
instrumentation installed but we don’t want to do so
in a manner that would create additional risk for the structure. So there will be a lot of thought
on the engineering details on that. – David, what about the
coring that he asked, the previous question? – Oh okay, well, when we
put in those piezometers, that’s an opportunity to go
deeper and check the bedrock as well– – [Senator] In the bedrock? – Yeah, and that’s part of our
plan to verify the bedrock. And what’s we’ve seen
immediately downstream of the FCO has been high quality
bedrock in relative terms for the spillway alignment. – [Joel] And that’s the
coring that just got done? – Oh yeah, well, there
has been recent drilling by the emergency spillway. That’s, I think, I don’t
know if it’s wrapped up. But there’s some specific
geologic features they wanted to try and chase down by
drilling on the upstream side of the emergency spillway. So there’s been a tremendous
amount of exploration that’s been done over
the past year and a half. – And I trust you’re considering
vegetation management too ’cause that was the big issue. – Yes, yeah, and there’s
some great studies and work done on tracing roots that
you see Davis Dr. Harter worked on and it was very
informative, I think, for not just us but for dam
owners across the US, yeah. Okay, so how will this be used? You know, measures identify
for the flood control outlet will be integrated with
those of the other tasks, as we mentioned at the project level. So as we envision our task
three, we will have a number of measures we’ll propose or recommend. We’re gonna identify the periodic
assessment and inspection requirements, those are
things that are obviously easy to implement, you know, there are things we should
live with in the future, FCO provides for robust
control flood control releases and we anticipate many
measures to be components of the proposed integrated plans. And so my point here is that we know we’ve got this facility. It’s a critical facility. We’re betting our money that
a lot of our task three items are going to be included
in the integrative plans because we know we’re gonna
have this facility in operation in the near future. We could identify smaller
measures that would be readily implementable, so those
are the things that we say you know what, we can easily achieve that, let’s go after it and just go
ahead and proceed with a small project perhaps even before
CNA comes to a conclusion. Any other questions? – Just a couple things. So one, what if anything did
the examination of those drains show and the testing of the anchors? Did that show anything to you
that is maybe of significance maybe for us? – The drains looked good. The way they were built and constructed, we couldn’t see everything and
we didn’t cover every single one of them, but those that
we did, they looked good and it gives us a good level of confidence that they’re operable. The other thing is that
as we do the analysis, we’re able to do sensitivity
analysis and assume, let’s assume the drains are plugged, what’s the stability of
the FCO in that condition versus we have 50%
efficiency on those drains? So there’s a number of
sensitivity analysis that we can perform to answer questions
and address uncertainties. On the anchors, anchor
rods for the radial gates, we’ve got at this point
three different methods of testing those anchors. One’s ultrasonic, looking
for near surface flaws. The other is called dispersive
wave, and that’s actually exciting the rod and it gives
us the estimate of tension in the rod and we compare that to the actual original design. And then we’ve also recently
had the Army Core use, I believe it’s called, I
believe it’s called pulse echo or guided, it’s an ultrasonic method, but they’re able to look
for breaks in rods at depth. I haven’t got their results
yet back but I’ve gotten the first two and they look positive. We’ve able to basically
validate, or get repeatability, in terms of the tension numbers
we’re seeing on the rods. And then also, with
our ultrasonic testing, looking for near surface flaws,
we aren’t seeing anything of significance there. But that topic is kind
of one of those things, it’s 50 years old, those rods
are not gonna live forever, so to speak, right? So that’s one of the
major considerations– – Haven’t there been some of
them have had cracking, right? We know that there are– – Yeah, there’s been two
that have cracked and failed, but we have engineering
analysis on record showing us the number that we need to
maintain safety with those gates. And off the top of my head,
it’s like eight or something like that, so it’s a lot
of redundancy already in those anchor rods, but it’s
a topic that we’re certainly delving into with task three. – Then can we also talk about
the testing of the foundation anchors, I think that was another thing. – Yeah, that was on this slide here, so yeah, when they demoed
the slab just downstream of the FCO, you can see
the jack and the pump and pressure gauge there. So we had Q-It pull on those. So I think we did six? And five of the six met
the design loads for those. The sixth one, the guy didn’t really have, the jack seated well, so it
was kind of a dud of a test. So we kind of threw that test out. But, it basically gave
us a level of confidence on the condition of
the roads in this style of anchor right next door to the FCO. As I mentioned on the drainage, in the analysis we do, we can play around with the efficiencies of the
anchors and make assumptions, let’s assume none of them are there, how’s the stability of the structure? If we can assume 50% efficiency,
how is the structure? So those are the kinds of
things we will look at, I think, in the level two
risks in the analysis. – And Assemblyman and
Senator, I know for me, I’m not a civil engineer,
so I’m a lot of times trying to make sure I understand
what they’re doing. In this stability analysis
that they’re doing which is really the meat of
telling us whether we need to reinforce or bolster
the infrastructure, these, this type of testing
was really to make sure that our assumptions are correct. So this really verifies
that this assumption that we’re making on how good the
drainage is or the anchors, that assumption is gonna
really, can change the outcome of the stability study. So this is all about making
sure the assumptions are correct so that the output of the study is correct so that we get the right information so we can make the right mitigations. And so for me, this was really
important because if your assumptions are one
way or the other wrong, then your answer’s wrong, basically. And so this is really gonna
help us on the assumptions. Oh sorry. – How many anchors do you have in total? – Oh underneath the FCO? Gosh, I’ll have to get
back to you on that. But, we can answer that. – Tens, hundreds? – It’s, I think, 50 to 100
or so just thinking about– – And you tested six? – We tested six, and of
course we can’t test the ones that are still part of the FCO. You know, that’d be very disruptive. We don’t want to do that. But yeah, and that’s,
like mentioning measures, one measure that might come
up is anchoring that structure to the rock with new,
deeper anchors, right? That’s a viable, potentially
viable measure that maybe an outcome or something
recommended by task three. And then we’ll have to take a look at that and just make sure are
we adding additional risk by doing that to the structure. So, you know, there’s pros
and cons, but that’s I think a very likely measure that we’ll
have at the end of the day. – You know what I think one
of the things that you know, that we’ve all learned, you
know, is that it’s not just what you know, it’s what you don’t know. And, what are the risks
with what we don’t know? And are we okay with that? Or do we need to do more
investigation so that we do know and so that we’re not
making assumptions so yeah. – Yeah, that’s what
this slide’s all about. Let’s reduce some uncertainty, right? Let’s collect some data and
let’s try and get as much information as we can. – And if we could just see,
you know, at some point kind of what is some of that
hard data that we’ve collected, you know, and obviously
for the IRB, obviously, that’s something that we
really need your assistance on in saying what do you guys
think about what we know and what we don’t know, right? – And then, Assemblyman,
this is where I think the legislation that you
guys passed on inspections and all that is gonna be
helpful because this is also an industry problem, not just a DWR. Meaning, those means and methods
to reduce the uncertainty because of the assumptions,
some of these things are not out there yet so we
really need the industry helping get to that point where we can. So I think what you did
is going to be helpful. This is going to be helpful. And ultimately, it’s the whole industry, we’re just at the point
where we’re kind of leading the charge and we need to. – Well, this is bill is state-wide. A lot of dams are going
to be inspected now and with a great more deal of vigilance. That’s all good. – I also wanted to note that
our Congressman has joined us, Congressman Doug LeMapha. Thank you for being here.
– Hey Doug. – Hey Doug.
– I didn’t see you. – I didn’t know if you
wanted to say anything, Doug? – I’ll hold. – Didn’t you have something, Ron? – I have a quick question. Your discussion here is
trying to look at structural stability and reliability
and factors of safety there at the existing outlet structures. But, getting back to our
last discussion about (heaving breathing) suggesting that the overall
combined spillway capacity is inadequate for the
traditional measures of spillway design outlets, um, I assume that the flood control
outlet structure that we have for the main spillway
is not particularly easy to expand and that that’s
the most obvious control or limiting factor on the
ability to get water to the main service spillway. So, if what we read, FERC is
challenging the department to essentially have
higher capacity spillways, if that’s how it turns
out, it’s early yet, the department’s going to have
to be thinking, potentially, either doing expanding capacity
would be auxiliary spillway or expanding capacity the
main spillway outer works and the shoot as a result of that. So, you would have, you may
have more than one challenge to deal with there. – Yeah, and I think task one
is going right after that issue about spillway capacity and
they get the fun of really exploring all the different
options and brainstorming how can we get more spillway capacity. And so I’m looking forward to
seeing what they come up with. – Okay, thanks. – All right, well shall
we move along to task five with Les we’re gonna talk us
through our last presentation? (men chattering) – Good morning, my name’s
Less Harder, some of you may remember that I used to work for the Department of Water
Resources for 30 years, was the Executive Manager, but
now I’ve been in the private sector for the last 10, and
now I’m back as a consultant to the department. I’m here to talk about the
task five status update and task five is about the
embankment reliability. So, a lot of what I’m going
to talk about is actually stuff that’s been ongoing prior to the Comprehensive Needs
Assessment and the background is that there were embankment
reliability studies underway prior to the Oroville
Spillway Incident 2017. These studies were initiated
after the 2014, 2015th Ninth FERC Five-Year Part
12D Report consultants to do some seepage and stability studies. In particular, there were
these two recommendations from that independent
board, R-10 and R-18. So R-10, recommendation R-10,
is that the board reiterates that the monitoring and
analysis of seepage, including turbidity, are
vital aspects of understanding the behavior of the dam,
particularly because very limited piezometric data are
being recorded in the dam. So, that recommendation also
had about 10 additional tasks associated with it that were
recommended by the board and the departments has been
studying those and carrying out those tasks since that time. It’s been spending millions
of dollars doing that. A second recommendation
related to the first one is recommendation 18. And, the board recommends
that the issue of potential instability associated with the
green spot on the downstream face of the dam toward the
left abutment between elevation 600 and elevation 700,
approximately, be investigated. Investigated should include
computational analyses to asses the effects of such a zone
on the static and seismic stability of the dam. And this also had some several
tasks associated with it that have been underway since that time. For those of you that don’t
know what the green spot is, it’s also known as the vegetated area. (everyone laughing)
– That’s quite a shot! – There might only be a few
of you that might not know what that is. – [Assemblyman] I don’t think
we need any explanation. – At different points in the year, downstream face of the dam turns green. The most prominent location
is a band about mid level, goes all the way across,
about between elevation 570 and 740, but it is more
concentrated on this portion, what we call the left
side looking downstream. So that’s the vegetated area. It turns green after
significant rainfall every year and then dries up every May or June. And it’s been doing that before
the reservoir was filled. So, how does this all fit
in with the CNA process? So, the ongoing seepage
analysis and stability analysis from the FERC Part 12D process
together with the upcoming new five year process that’s
going to start in January and run from January
through March and include the Level Two Risk
Analysis mandated by FERC, that’s going to provide
important information for identifying the existing
conditions of the dam, the embankment dam,
existing or baseline risks, and potential improvement
or risk reduction needs. And that’s what all
what task five is about is look at what we can do to reduce risks for the embankment for the
portion of the Oroville Complex. So how do we do that? We have to merge all of those
studies that are ongoing into the CNA process. So, you’ve only seen this
table three times before but it’s important to
reinforce this CNA process is a water resource planning
approach initiative. And we have six steps here
over the next two years or so. And, steps one through
six, we’re in step one as David said when he
was talking about the FCO headwork structure. We’re basically in the identifying
objectives, constraints, opportunities, and
needs approach or phase. So that’s where we’re at. And so we’re going to take
all the work that we’ve been doing for the last
few years on R-10 and R-18 and then they’ll be fed
into the Part 12D process and the Level Two Risk
Analysis coming up in March, January and March. So this work is going to
feed into that process and the results of the upcoming
risk analysis in January and March will then feed
back to the CNA to provide information on existing
conditions, existing risks, and potential risk reduction measures. And those will then be
developed under the CNA process under the task five portion of it. – Perceptive, Assemblyman, legislation, will this be applicable to all dams that you’re gonna be looking at? – So the Part 12 process, the PFMA– – [Assemblyman] That’s FERC. – Is already applied to
all dams regulated by FERC. – Yeah.
– Yeah. – [Assemblyman] That’s
the federal process, yeah. – In addition, there’s a
provision in the state water code that requires all DWR dams to
be looked at every five years whether they’re regulated by FERC or not and examined and reviewed
by a board of independent consultant.
– Okay. – All right so, when we talk
about potential failure modes, what we’re talking about
when we look at that is how could the dam possibly be
distressed or even fail? So we think of ideas. What are the possibilities
whether it could be overtopped or internal erosion or slope stability or other seepage issues. So, here are some notable
ones for Oroville in the past because we do these every five years. So some of the notable
ones in the past is that the Zone 1 Core, the
central core on the dam, might be piping or having
internal erosion through broken instrumentation tubes
leading to dam failure. So that’s been looked at before
and will be looked at again. Failure of Palermo Tunnel
Outlet, that’s one of the four outlets out of Oroville Dam
leading to erosion of the left downstream groin and failure of the dam. Internal erosion of Zone
1 Core due to filter incompatibility with Zone 2 Transition, that’s actually one of the
tasks that the 2014, 2015 FERC Part 12 Board asked us
to look at and we have been looking at that. Embankment erosion under
flood loading along the FCO Monolith 31, that’s
where the embankment dam meets up with the monoliths
associated with the headwork structure for the control spillway. So that’s right where they tie together. So that’s a zone of potential
differential movement and potential for concentrated seepage. And of course, potential
instability associated with the vegetated area or green spot, that’s something we’ve been looking at. We have constraints in the
process for the planning process for the CNA. We are working with an
as-constructed structure, we have to deal with what we have. That structure has different
zones in it in the embankment and they all have different
properties and abilities to hold back water. One of them is the existing
conditions, the existing seepage that goes through the
dam, the phreatic surface, the surface of the water through the dam, and underneath the dam. A limited number of piezometers,
we actually don’t have any that are fully functional. Some are partially functional. And we have significant
seismic and flood loadings. We are in a seismic area
here, there is an active fault that’s next to the dam. It’s potential to give a
magnitude up to six and a half or so and we’ve already
been talking all morning about potential flood loadings. A lot of these things have
been analyzed multiple times in the 50 year history of the dam. Some of them are fairly recent
but some of those analyses are quite old, they’re decades
old, and need to be updated. So that’s some of our constraints. We have variabilites
under existing conditions and issues and uncertainties. There are variabilities and
uncertainties in material properties of the dam. The dam is the highest
dam in the United States, it’s a mile wide at the
top, all sorts of different, there’s a range of materials
that were put into it. There is the issue of
filter compatibility between the core and the filter,
that’s something that the FERC board asked us to look at
and we have been looking at. The vegetation area, toe
seepage measurements, the dam was designed with
very sophisticated elaborate system to collect seepage. It is influenced by rainfall, however. And so that scares some of
the seepage measurements for part of the year. And then again we talked
about broken piezometer tubing in the core and embankment zones. What does that have, impacts
that have on the integrity of the dam? The risen need for more
sophisticated seepage modeling, which we are actually doing, and a need for more
sophisticated stability modeling which we’re in the process of initiating. And of course there’s
potential issues at the contact between the Embankment
Dam and the FCO Monoliths. So we have between R-10 and
R-18 there’s about 16 different sub tasks. Many of them are completely
done, they’re 100% complete. Like for instance, collecting
all the available data on the properties of the dam. So one of the things that DWR
did was went back to its attic and microfilm records and
collected all the construction data for the dam. So, during construction,
they collected or made tests of density or the moisture
content of the fill, degradation, how plastic
it was, and so on. Well, each of those tasks is
associated with a coordinate in the dam, a location, an
elevation location along the dam station and whether it’s
upstream or downstream. And a fourth dimension,
time, point in time. How many records do we have? Seven thousand. (person coughing) And so, those have been put
into a database that can then be queried. So if you want to know one
particular part of the dam, what the characteristics
are of that particular zone for a certain length or a
certain upstream length, you can find that out. You can also use it graphically. This is a picture of some
of the tasks done in some of the zones at different points in time. This is just for the central
500 feet, so like I said, the dam is about a mile long at the top, so if we just look at the
maximum section, say 500 feet in the central area, these
are some of the tests done at different points in time. So this is a cross-section
of the different tests that were available. There’s data available in
1965 and they show that we see the Coffer Dam was initially placed here, the different zones in the Coffer Dam, some at core block, and some at the beginning of the main dam. So we can inquire it like that. We can also look at what it
looked like in October 1966, a year and a half later. And so, we see the different
colors here represent the different zones, each of
these is a piece of information about the kind of material
that went into the dam. One of the things you
see is the surface here in October 1966 and it
slopes down right here where the vegetation area. Well, this actually plays a
role with why there is a green spot here because what happened
is that during the winter of ’66, ’67, rain water
ponded here intended to result in stratified materials. So that’s actually a clue to
the history of the green spot. We can inquire it from
material properties. This is information from
the Downstream Zone Three, which is the shallow dam,
which is a sandy gravel. And what we have here is
the function of elevation is all this data and what we’re
plotting here is the percent passing the number of core civ. That tells us how much sand
and finer material is in there. So the design intent for that
material is only to have 25% or less, and most of it is there. It’s less than 25. But there’s certain areas
where it got dirtier than that, certain elevations. So there’s one here, there’s
one here, and one here. This is the band for the
where the green spot is so that plays a role in part of it. One of the interesting things
is that these are color coded, the red means that
it’s on the left side, and the blue is on the right side. We don’t see a difference
between the left or right so the reason why it’s
concentrated on the left is not because of the material properties where that green spot is
more concentrated there. But this helps us give a
picture of the overall dam. And like I said, there’s
seven thousand of these points in the data poise. – Was there any degradation
over time with the metamorphic rock that, the bedrock? Did that hold together pretty well? – It holds pretty well– – There seem to be degradation
of the more friable material when you look at it. But I was concerned about the bedrock. – So, the foundation of the
dam, the big foundation, they stripped off all the soil off of it from the Luvian Include,
they stripped all that off. And then for the core of the
dam, the thing that has to hold back water, they excavated down
to get to very high-quality rocks, slightly weathered or fresh. So if you remember all
those pictures you saw of the erosion on the spillway
a year and a half ago, you saw some weathered rock at
the top that’s kind of brown in color and some pretty
good rock that was blue but you had to get 80
feet down to get to that, that’s what they got to for the core. So the core, which is
important to hold back water, went down to that kind of
rock and then that rock was treated with concrete, and then the core was placed on it. – It sorta surprised me–
– That part is protected very well. – That that went down 80 or or 90 feet I think to hit that rock. – Depends where you are. Um, in this canyon, there
was already a lot of erosion, already had removed rock
because of the river channel was eroding, so you didn’t have
to get down to 80 feet there but sometimes the cut
off trench for the core is 40 or 50 feet deep. – [Senator] Yep. – And then, the rest of the
dam had to get down to what they called moderately weathered rock so the decomposed rock
was removed but fairly, more weathered but still
pretty firm rock was used for the basin, for the rest
of the zones of the dam. And those are covered
by the embankment now. So there’s no more
weathering on top of that. – Thank you. – What do you mean by those other zones. What would that look like on a map? – So… – You’re talking the first area
would be the very river base itself to a width of
how wide on each side? Did they cut down to the blue rock there? – All right, so here’s the
overall cross section of the dam. Here’s the central clay core. They would cut down into
the rock maybe 40, 50 feet. This part here, the bulk of
the dam, is actually made out of the old dredge tailings
from the Feather River, sand and gravel, cobbles up
to typically about six inches of rounded rock. Those are pretty pervious
so it’s not necessary to get down to the highest quality
rock, but all the soil is removed and all the
weathered rock was removed all the way down. So that, you know, stripping
could be five feet, sometimes could be 20 feet. – How wide is the dam at its
base from North to South? – Well, at the top here, it’s
about 4800 feet long so it’s– – [Congressman] The other
direction of the river? – This way from here to here? – [Congressman] Yes. – It’s about a quarter of a mile long. So this is about 770 feet
and it’s about five times that width, so about 3500,
actually close to half a mile. But that’s at the very
bottom of the river. – Yes sir, so what you’re
talking about when you cut down to that core, new bedrock,
what I was talking about, is the full width of the
dam and the river base going all the way up to the– – [Speaker] That’s right. – Means on the West and the East? I wanna turn the dam 90
degrees and look at it that way from your photo there. – Right, so its’ a v-shaped canyon. – [Congressman] Yes sir. – So that core is in a trench not only at the bottom but
all the way up both sides. All the way up to the top. – Right, that’s. – [Joel] You’re gonna plan
B on the little plot there, you wanna point that out? – Yeah. So, this is a v-shaped canyon. The maximum cross-section
is here in the middle and then the core goes all the way across and it’s sitting in the rock. The rock was excavated
into a trench, basically, they removed the weathered
rock down to where the high quality rock and the core sits in that. – That’s good information
because obviously with the main spillway having evidently
built on weathered rock, I think the public would
rest very well assured that that wasn’t the case
with the core of the dam. Is there a good documents or
engineering charts that are still available on that? I know some of the these have
gone missing over the years of some of the other issues
when this came about. Is that something that
could be illustrated with old records and old– – Absolutely, so the footprint
of the dam was mapped in detail by geologists
during construction. And then, that includes that
trench that we were just talking about. And so in addition to
that, there are photographs of what that trench looked like and how deep it was. And it’s easy to provide those. – [Congressman] Thank you. – Okay, I have no idea where
I was but I think I was here. So, anyway, so, some of the
other tasks that we’ve done like seepage and stability modeling, they’re in a preliminary
stage, intermediate stage, a lot of the seepage
studies have been done, some of the slope stability analysis are just being initiated. So I will talk about this. This is a two dimensional
seepage study of the main section of the dam and this is the
computer model, right here. It’s a finite element model. It’s two dimensions so it’s
a two dimensional model here and we put in different
properties in the dam. And then we model it seepage
and what you see here is in these color codes
represent different pressures. If you see these lines, those
are intended to be flow lines to show you the direction of seepage. And one of the things you
see here is you see hardly anything going through the core
’cause the core is basically almost impervious. And so what seepage you do see
is coming in the foundation and then it gets up to,
this is the river level downstream of the dam. And this is an internal
seepage collection pool within the dam that’s used to
collect and monitor seepage. So, it’s not, all this is dry here, it’s unsaturated from the model, and we’re not surprised to
see this because this material here, very dense, clay gravel. And you guys are familiar
with the cutoff walls that we’ve been putting in the
levies on the Feather River in Southern Uva Counties. So, this core is 100 times
less pervious than those cutoff walls. And those cutoff walls only
three feet wide in the levies. This core is 200 feet wide in the base. So we don’t expect water to go through it. And so that’s what the models show. Now, I said there was no
piezometers that are currently functional but we had many that
were functional for 35 years and they show, these dots
show the locations of those piezometers that read information
between 1965 and 2000. The system was abandoned in 2000. All the ones here show with
the hollow dot read dry. All the ones with a blue dot
read the seepage internal pool which is just what the model shows. – So that point, piezometers,
do you have a budget figure, another words what you would
need to replace sufficient numbers, has that ever been requested? Because I’d like to work
with you on the budget if that’s an issue, the money to replace. – A lot of, they originally
put 56 piezometers in the dam. The purpose of those
piezometers, some of them, was just to see how things are registered during construction. So we don’t need all of those back. At least a dozen of them were
in the upstream pervious zone and all they ever registered
was the reservoir level. And we have better ways
to determine how high the reservoir level is.
– Yeah. – We don’t need to replace all of them. We have been looking at
part of our task under the FERC Part 12
recommendations is to look at the additional instrumentation, replacement instrumentation. We have a good feel where
this seepage pool is, we track it here at the measuring
vault with some indicators still here in the partially
functional piezometers where that pool is. But we are looking at new piezometers, or replacement piezometers,
in the foundation and maybe then tap into this pool. And, it’s quite likely
we’re going to put some in. And I don’t think it’s
a matter of budgeting. It’s just whether or not we need to do it and whether or not it’s useful. I will say, we don’t want
to put any in the core because we could probably
damage the core if we try to put them in. There’s not a need to
put them in the core. So we’re probably not gonna do those. But we are gonna be looking
at that, and I will tell you, I’m pretty confident
we’ll be putting some in in the near future. – Thank you. – You’re gonna have an updated
technology for that obviously from 1960 something–
– Yes. – So, in previous visits you
did, and your colleagues, talked about these were more
seen as temporary construction immediately after monitors
not meant to be forever. So you don’t just go down there
and replace most of those, they don’t have a handy access
tunnel you can just send a guy down there to pop
in a new one, right? You’re gonna have pretty,
is it gonna require boring? – No matter where we put it,
it will require some type of boring. Some of the ones that
we’re maybe looking at now, there are, in the river
channel to minimize settlement of the core we put this
footing for the core. It’s call the concrete core block. And there are galleries
in here that we walk to and we inspect on a weekly
or daily basis sometimes. And we can drill some of them from here. And so we may be looking at
installing them from here as opposed to drilling
them 700 feet that way. So drilling them here might
only be 80 foot borings. – You mentioned these
piezometer tubes earlier too that those could be long-shot
possibility of a seepage area, correct? – Well, there are about 200
tubes that go into different parts of the dam from
different measuring areas. These tubes are about
that much in diameter, they’re about a quarter of
an inch inside diameter. They’re plastic saran. A lot of them broke during
initial construction and then broke over the years after that. And so, one of the potential
failure roads I talked about is could they, could there
be concentrated seepage on them or in and around them, and that’s one of the things that has been looked at over time. Did that answer your question? – Yeah, what I was getting
to is do they have, do they terminate at a surface
area where you could force some type of material down
them to basically plug them if you could find them and access them? Or are they all internally inside? – Well, they all have ends
and they have ends either here in this gallery here or there’s
an instrument house here where half of them end. And, we did look at
potentially grouting them up over time, and the kind of
grout you would have to do it is basically a chemical grout. And we did test in DWR’s
lab about the practicality of trying to do it. Some of these tubes are 1000 feet long. And they have multiple breaks in them and we don’t know where
all the breaks are. And what we decided is that
we could probably seal up the ends but that would still
let water into different areas that we couldn’t see. So we decided instead to cut
them and let water drip out of them so we could observe that. – [Congressman] Yeah, that makes sense. – And so that was better
than plugging them off and not knowing where the water would go. So I’m taking up too much
of your time, I’m sorry. I’ll try and speed this up. I will say, so this is
a two dimensional model. It just represents the
cross-section, maximum section. We are developing a
three-dimensional seepage model to look at seepage. So this is the topography
of the model in the computer and this is some of the
elements that represent different properties. This is the largest model, 3D model, that the software company
has ever tried to model. We’re working with the
Subtle Vision, a vendor, that has 3D seepage analysis. This is the biggest
model they’ve ever tried and we’re trying to
make it work right now. So, more to come on that. We have gone back to look at the history of the vegetated area, the green spot. So I told you it was
there before construction was completed, before
there was a reservoir. So this is a photograph of
the dam under construction in January 1967. The dam’s only partly built
and we see the wet spots. Well, where are these
wet spots coming from? Coming from precipitation, from rain. It’s falling on the surface
and it’s getting perched on some of the dirtier layers
here and it’s coming out on the face. So this was doing this, this seepage here, there’s no reservoir, it’s
not coming through the core. This is all rain water. And people understood it at the time, safety dams, inspection
reports from the 60’s show that this is what it was. DWR knew what it was. Monitor it, we saw water ponding on the, this is water ponds here, all long before there was a reservoir. And, again, this is 1967. When this was built in
the winter of ’66 and ’67, that green spot area was
one of the wettest winters for Oroville, 40 inches
of rain in that season. And that resulted or helped
create these stratified layers that make this seepage
band wetter than usual and it gets green every
time it starts raining, like in December or so, and
stays green until late May, and by June or so it is bone dry. So, this has been reviewed,
this issue’s been reviewed since it first started turning green. And the first five year FERC Independent Board of
Consultants looked at this in 1973 five years after initial
filling and they concluded with the department’s position that this is a precipitation behavior, not a seepage behavior through the core. – [Congressman] What year
was the first year the lake reads the level that was
higher than that elevation? – 1968. – [Congressman] ’68 so you
have at least two years worth of data that shows it was
green before there was water behind the dam. – Yep. So, most recently, we presented
some of these findings for the Board of Consultants
for the Spillway Recovery Team last year and they also concurred
that it was precipitation related, not seepage. The last year the department
published this document, it’s a 27-page document
about some of the seepage and conditions in the
dam, different zones, how seepage is controlled,
and about the history of the green spot and the
rainfall and precipitation. So, this was all
distributed out a year ago. I’m sure we can send it to
you if you’re interested. Next steps for us is to
on task five to complete these studies and look at other aspects, not just seepage and slope
stability, but maybe things like earthquake or preferred
seepage in different areas. Use results of these studies
to inform the upcoming risk analysis and PFMA process
for FERC in January to March. And then use them to identify
what are the existing risks and what are the needs for potential risk reduction measures. Sorry to take up your time. – [Congressman] No, thank you
very much, we appreciate it. – Thanks, yes.
– Yes. – [Assemblyman] Not a waste, it’s an important issue.
– Yes, you got a quick question? – Les, on your variability
of material properties and dam material slide, what’s the significance
of the dashed black line? – So the slide (muttering). So again, this is a plot of
data, the plot is the function of elevations from the top
of the dam here in 1992. This is percent passing
in number four civ, which is telling us how
much sand and finer material is entering through. So this magic line, 25%
was the specification limit that was originally set
during design said we, the designers, don’t want to
see anything dirtier right here of this line. In the event we borrow, that they pick, there’s several borrow
areas along the river the drench tails and (muttering) was dirtier than they anticipated. So as a result of this, because it got dirtier
than we anticipated, they put in an extra drain
so there’s a downstream vertical drain and it’ll fill of zone five that they put in to accept any seepage. That’s this drain right here. They put that in as a result
of getting dirtier output. To answer your question is that respect for the zone three material. – So I mean, I guess what
I’m interpreting from your presentation, Les, is based on this model, which I’m assuming is based
on whatever instrumentalities we have to be able to check seepage, shows that there’s been no seepage on the non-reservoir side, right? – Well, I didn’t say zero. There’s some– – Well, why’s it all white then? – Well, because what happens
is it basically comes through here and I’m gonna say,
when I say it comes through? It’s weeping, there’s only
a few gallons per minute coming through the core. – [Assemblyman] Okay. – And then what happens is
it hits the pervious zone, these materials are a
million time more pervious than the core. So what happens is that as soon
as it hits those materials, it just drops down to the bottom, it just rides the walk here– – [Assemblyman] And we can measure that, and we’ve been able to measure that? – We have a meter here
that measures the seepage. – [Assemblyman] Well,
that measures the outflow. But are we able to measure
that’s exactly what it does going through the– – We don’t have a direct
measure right here, if that’s what your question.
– Right. – We have an exact measure right here and this measurement collects
whatever’s going through the core and whether it
comes up from the rock. We think during the summer
it’s less than 10 gallons a minute and we think most of
that’s coming from the rock. And so during the winter
months we get rainfall in here too which percolates in here
and gets up to 100 gallons a minute but as soon as it stops raining, it stops, this water starts dropping down. Like I said, gets down close to– – So, rain water is going
through that white space? – [Les] Yep. – Down into the– – So it goes all the way
down here into this pool, the pool that’s measured and collected, it also percolates in here
and it saturates the dirtier materials here, which allows
water to come through– – But we can say confidently
that none of that water is coming from the other side of the… – Well, we are confident but– – We know there’s water
percolating down into that lower end and comes out at the outflow, right? – [Les] Yep. – And we can say confidently
that none of that water is water that’s coming from,
none of the water going through the white area is coming
from the other side there? From the reservoir? – There’s a little bit from
the core but as soon as it hits the white area, it dribbles
down and comes down here. Actually hits the rock,
comes down at the, you know, what Congressman LeMapha
was talking about, water came in here, hits the
rock, and then it flows down the top of the rock and
collected down here. – And we know that because what? – Well, first of all, this
was the way it was designed so the design was intent. And we know that this seepage
output pools only measures a certain amount. How much is measures matches
exactly, almost exactly, what the properties of the
core tell us come through. So that’s consistent. We’ve had consistent
instruments here that show us it was all dry… – [Assemblyman] Right, but now those don’t work anymore.
– It was all dry here. These instruments here,
which worked for 35 years all show that it’s all dry up here so whatever water’s coming from the core is just dropping down. – [Assemblyman] Okay. – And it’s just weeping, so– – And when we could measure
those, it showed dry? – Yes, and actually, those
tubes still are connected into this gallery here and they’re dry. If they were connected to
water, they’d be dripping water and they’re not.
– Okay. – So, it’s still dry. So in addition to these
instruments, I don’t have this slide here but we had
instruments here for measuring sediment, casings, and we
can measure water levels in those casings. And they also say it’s dry. So there’s pretty much an
overwhelming set of information that tells us how seepages. The next steps is now that
we know there’s a little bit of wet spots saturated here, how does that affect overall stability? So we’ve done stability
analysis in the past, we’re now gonna update them
with additional information and a more sophisticated of
analysis until we get done. – Les, real quick, the density,
the workhorse of the thing is that red portion, the core. Everything to the right
is not really intended to be a water holding system, it’s just holding the dam in place. – Correct, more or less. – So how dense is the material in the blue on the lake side of the red core there? Is that denser than the
white area to the right? – So, this material looks
very much like that material. They replaced it, certain
parts were replaced at different times, but this
is the same stuff that this is. There is a filter right here
on both sides of the core that is similar to these but
is finer so it’s intended to filter this as well, so– – More dense than the
white and the blue area but not as dense, by far,
as the red core area, right? – So, this material here
used to have dry densities, take a sample of that material
and take the water out of it, just the soil part of it,
its dry density sits between 145 and 155 pounds per cubic foot, which is equivalent to settled concrete. This is very dense material. It was put in, it wasn’t
dumped, some dams are dumped. But, these were placed in lifts. The lift sizes were two feet
and they would have each lift was passed over with migratory
rollers to make it dense, and they took this material
and tested it at UC Berkeley in the 60’s and 70’s and
tested Oroville Dam material, the shell here, zone three,
and had some high strengths on record for it. So it has very high resistance. – Does this satisfy FERC
’cause like you said, they keep bringing it up. They keep pointing to this
green spot and saying we need to monitor, you need to monitor
this, you need to provide us with your data. – So, some way yeah, and one
of the people who recommended these studies, Dr. Medeas right there. (everyone chuckling) – Guilty as charged. – Guilty! – A lot of these issues and
incentives should study these and document these and I think
the department’s position is we know a lot about this stuff and we know what’s going on but I think (muttering), but I think the point was you
need to document this better. And, you have all this information, tons of information, but
it’s not in concise documents that regulators like on
safety dams or the FERC or the intending consuming
world will look at. So go ahead and please document that. Do those studies, update
them, and document. And that’s what we’re
doing, and I think that was a good set of recommendations. And so, we’re in the
process of doing that. So, the next generation
won’t have to go through a microphone, they can find those records. All right. – All right, thank you, Les. – Thanks, Les. – So were at 11 now and (chuckling). – Yeah, so I think there
was a couple of items here that I propose to condense. One is we’re gonna go through
those requests for a comment log so we prepared a comment
log that has all the IRB comments and that our, we
say if everything we concur or whether we’re pending
or whether we don’t concur and then we also say whether
this is open or closed. So this is a snap, this is a running log, this is a snapshot in time. So I’m just gonna hand
this to Rob and let Rob distribute it to the group there. And this little description on the front and if you have questions let me know. This is something we’ll update, so it might look different
as we work on this next time. Our plan is to make this
available to you each meeting. It’s printed out very small
so ultimately the electronic version we’ll send to you as well. – Good. – So then the next item, so we, I’m gonna propose we skip
the break and we let the IRB do their presentation– – [Assemblyman] Right. – And then we can conclude with, I know, I don’t want to cut the ad hoc short. I know we’ve been doing a lot
of the discussion as we go. But then after the IRB goes,
then we can take whatever time the ad hoc group would
like for further discussion. – Great. – And then I think we can adjourn. So, Boots, are you? – I think they’re getting
the presentation pulled up for us right now. While they’re pulling that
up, at the meeting earlier this month, the second meeting of the IRB, we welcomed Dan Wade to the group. And so– – [Official] Can you just get a mic? – Oh, yes, thank you. So maybe what we’ll do is
just ask Dan to stand up and maybe give a little bit of background just like the rest of us did
at the last first meeting. – All right thanks Bruce. Good morning, Dan Wade, good to be here. Bruce just asked me to
let you know a little bit about who I am. So, I am a Western Civil Engineer (papers rustling) in the State of California. Stayed in News, actually
some of the professors that worked on this facility. But and others, then I
went to Virginia Tech for graduate studies, learned
more about this facility because a lot of the work
being the Chief of Engineering advanced during the
construction of this facility. I, in my career, I’ve
been in dams of hydropower for the entire, for my entire career. First 18 years in the private sector, the last 12 years working
for the city and county of San Francisco. We own and operate the
Huthutchie Water System. We have 18 dams as part of that system. I came to the city 12 years
ago to help manage what we call The Water System Improvement
Program, which is a 4.8 billion dollar program to repair,
replace, upgrade critical infrastructure associated
with that system. We’re about 96% complete with that. I’m the director of the program. I’m also overseeing a two
billion dollar 10 year capital improvement program
for the city and county of San Francisco. And so, I think probably a
unique perspective that I bring is having been in the private
sector as a consultant working on these facilities
as well as a representative of an owner agency implementing
large infrastructure projects working with a
lot of stake-holder groups similar to this in
implementing those projects. So that’s a little bit
about me, thanks Bruce. – Great, thanks Dan. – And it’s a pleasure to be
here and I hope to be able to make a contribution in listening to the issues here today. – [Senator] Welcome aboard and thank you. – Okay, so this morning,
just to give you a little bit of context, this one? (gentlemen laughing) All right, we’ll get the right mic here. All right so, just for
a little bit of context, being an independent board,
a lot of what we’ve seen here this morning actually
begins to respond to some of the things we gave recommendations on just a few weeks ago. So, as you see some of the
things that I’ll summarize here, just recognize that some of
the presentations you’ve seen earlier this morning are
already beginning to deal with those issues. Now, not that we’re out of
sync or anything like that, we’re just three weeks
further down the road in a very rapidly developing study. So, just bear with us on that. So, IRB members, just as a quick reminder, Betty Andrews, Leilo Mejia,
myself, Paul Shweiger, and Dan Wade. Some general observations
at the second meeting that we saw, first of
all, notable progress. This is moving fast, they are
making significant progress in being able to address
the prior recommendations. I think one of the things
that we were very happy to see while in our first board
report we had recommended a task seven. They chose to go in a little
bit different direction and just move what we
suggested as a task seven, they moved it up to a
project management activity. And so essentially, what you’re
seeing is more study wide activities that are taking
place in order to integrate everything that’s going on. I think we see this as
it’s going to improve both the efficiency and
the quality of the work that comes out of the study. All right so, let’s get
down to some of the specific recommendations. They gave us a list, I think
on this one it was about six questions, it was six or seven questions, that they asked us to address. The last one being a
catchall to just give us the opportunity to comment
on anything that we wanted to comment on. So let me just run
through these real fast. First of all, did we have
any comments regarding the approach and the integration
summarized in the materials given during the meeting? We thought that the approach
has been appropriately refined. I know there’s some debate
and disagreement about what the overall scope is. I think our general feeling
is that there are things that are directly related
to dam safety, which I think was their intent of doing
a comprehensive review, and there are things that are
related to other processes that are in play. And, being able to kind of
sort out which of those issues belong in which processes
is very important for being able to get
focused and move all of those processes forward in a way
that is helpful to everyone. We were pleased to see the
linkages between the forensics with the forensics team report
and the Part 12 inspection. We think all of that information
comes together in a way that will certainly help
whatever recommendations come out of this particular CNA study. And then finally, the
appropriate continued emphasis on identifying what are those
opportunities that what if the team sees something that
could be an immediate risk reduction that is within
the preview of DWR to just address it, there seems
to be a genuine commitment to identify those things
as opportunities that they can address right away. The second question was on the
project evaluation approach. This was something that
we, in our first meeting, wanted to see more of an emphasis
on getting the evaluation criteria laid out earlier in the process so that there could be no
impression that the evaluation criteria was being developing
in order to just justify whatever the recommendations
were coming out of the report. We think having that on the
table before the measures are identified, before the
plans are put together, just adds more credibility to the process. We did suggest one additional
evaluation criteria and that was permittability,
not so much whether or not it’s easy, more about whether
or not there’s an assessment of what level of effort would
be necessary to get permits to do some of the things
that are being talked about just as one more evaluation
factor to be considered. The other thing that has
already been eliminated when they gave us the
presentations earlier this month, was that there was a notion
of primary evaluation criteria and secondary evaluation criteria. We recommended that that
distinction be removed because in the decision making process, the decision makers themselves will make their determinations as to
which criteria should be given the greatest weight. This is kind of a classic
problem of all water resources management issues as you try to study them and try to make reasonable decisions. I think there were some
comments, I think it came in the discussion about recreation. My encouragement to all of
you would be to think in terms of any one of those criteria
has both what you would call objectives and it would have constraints. Certainly those things that
are in the license agreement would be constraints, that if
you’re gonna violate something in the license agreement,
that becomes a no go for some of the measures. And so, that’s one level. The other level is an
objective where you’re trying to maximize how many
objectives can be satisfied or the degree to which
all of those objectives can be satisfied along the way. All right, the third question
was questions regarding the Water Control Manual. The notion of the IRB was
that the Water Control Manual is a product of the core of engineers. Certainly it has very strong
linkages to what is recommended out of the CNA study here. I think that it’s certainly
wise to have interim operating plans, but to think that those
could become the permanent solution, I don’t see how
that would ever replace the core of engineers
responsibility for having a Water Control Manual
for the Feather River, not without going through the
full process because certainly one of the things you run up against is, and this is classic in
water resources management, that it’s really easy to go
through an optimize the system for any one objective. But, when you start to
introduce multiple objectives, and you saw the list that DWR presented, you can’t optimize for flood
control and still provide water delivery. You can’t optimize for those two and still provide recreation. Or you may severely limit
what some of those other objectives are, this is the
reason why it is so difficult for the core to work through
the process of coming up with a Water Control Manual. One of the things that I
didn’t really hear emphasized very much this morning, the
current Water Control Manual has a fundamental assumption
that Marysville Reservoir would have been built and
would be providing additional flood control. So the reason that the
current curves for Oroville, quote on quote, don’t
work is you’re missing a key part of what was
envisioned in the original plan for the Feather River.
– Well, just so you know, we’ve been saying that for years. It didn’t get said this morning, but– – [Speaker] I understand. I understand but–
– That is part of the fundamental flaw of
what is going on, you know. – I completely agree with
that and I’m not saying people aren’t saying it. But to think we can jump past
that and take a temporary solution and make it the
permanent fix without really addressing the fundamental
underlying issue, I think, be careful of trying to
do something like that. It’s a dangerous proposition
that has unintended consequences associated with it. We also recommend looking
at the flood control outlet release limitation. It’s really been based on
the downstream levy capacity, but that downstream levy
capacity has been represented as a single number. I don’t think that 100, that
if you put 150 thousand dollar, or 150 thousand CFS down the river, I don’t believe that you can
say with absolute certainty you can pass that with no trouble. I also think you can’t say
that at 150 thousand and one CFS that they fail. And so, we’re just suggesting
looking at it in a little bit more probablistic fashion that
there’s probably some number that you can have a very
high degree of confidence in, and maybe that’s the 150 number. Maybe that’s how it was come up with. But, there’s probably
some other set of numbers that begin to describe what
might you be able to get down the river with some
probability of not having severe failures. So, just more of a risk
management approach to it. We agree with limiting
the power plant outflows. In our report we kind
of give some explanation as to why that’s a very
common thing in terms of using power plants as outlets. And then finally, some consideration of
measures to eliminate grid demand or grid
failure as limiting factors in the power plant capacity. Because you’re depending on
the power plant for releases, one of the failure modes
that might prevent that is if for some reason you
can’t get power onto the grid for whatever reason that might be. How many redundancies do we have? What are the things that could
potentially stop the power from getting to the grid? One thing actually brought
up by DWR is apparently as you begin to make more and
more releases down the river, the tail water is going
to come up in the river in order to get that capacity. Well, there’s actually
a tail water elevation at which they have to
shut down the power plant simply because the water
is gonna get up to a level where you are either outside
the range for the operations of the turbans or you’re
beginning to flood the power plant itself and you have de-energize it. – I think that’s unclear,
your recommendation here. At least your summary. Are you saying the department
should explore physical and operational changes, some of which have already been done, to ensure that they can, they have demand, and therefore can use the powerhouse? That’s what you’re talking
about, increasing– – If you can’t send the energy somewhere– – Oh, I know that. – You can’t spin the turbans. – But is the recommendation to
then assume that essentially that you have a power
failure, that the powerhouse capacity can’t be used? Or is the recommendation
that as part of the physical and operational changes that the Comprehensive
Needs Assessment work on and that is already been worked on, to increase the reliability
of actually having demand and being able to deliver demand to, and therefore keep the powerhouse running? – So I think our
recommendation at this point is to asses whether or
not that’s an issue. It may be that they have multiple avenues of redundancy already. But, before we start saying,
you know, let’s increase that redundancy or let’s
increase that reliability, let’s get a good assessment
of what the current situation is. – Okay.
– Yeah. All right, the next one that
we looked at is the analysis for the flood control head works. I think we feel very
confident in their analysis of the stability of the head works.
– Good looking boots. – The one thing that we do
recommend is because of the new PMF the routings need to be
run and if there’s a difference in maximum reservoir elevation,
that needs to be updated, the stability analysis need to be updated for a new situation
given the new hydrology. The second one is kind of a
little bit different twists. So you can do all the
stability analysis you want, you have a basic assumption
that that monolith acts as a monolith, that it
is a single structure and that if it is going to move, the whole thing moves together. One of the things that you
have to take a look at is how do the stresses behave
within that structure because it could be that
you have some area within the structure that is weak
under certain loading conditions and if it fails before the
rest of the structure fails, then you begin to get kind of an unzipping of the structure. And so, what we agree with
is there has been a proposal for a non-liner stress analysis. This was actually done at
Folsom Dam for the new joint federal project because they
used the flood control outlet as the model for the
new flood control outlet at Folsom Dam. And they did the stress analysis. The big concern there
was how does it perform in an earthquake and so
what they found out is yes, there are weak areas and there
are areas you have to pay attention to and so we
think exactly that same type of analysis needs to be performed
here so that there can be decisions about whether or
not the existing structure is adequate for earthquake loads. Because, the earthquake loads
that it was designed for are far different than what we
understand them to be today. And then finally, um just in
coming up with a written plan for addressing seismic
performance of the electrical and mechanical equipment. So, I think they’ve talked
a lot about the structure, the big gates themselves, other piece of that is there’s
a whole bunch of electrical and mechanical parts that
are required to operate those gates and making
sure that everything’s going to perform, that it’s anchored down, that you’re not gonna have
pieces flying off in the event of an earthquake, that
you’re left with a facility that’s still operational
when the earthquake is over. All right so task five
on the embankment dam, commendable effort by DWR to
pull together all of the data regarding the seepage and
stability issues identified in the Part 12D process, we
do recommend a little bit broader consideration of
potential failure modes to determine if there are other
issues that have not come up in the Part 12D process. Not that this isn’t that
there’s a smoking gun or anything like that, it’s
just having kind of an open mind to things that might be
raised as issues so that they can be chased down. It’s the green spot which
kind of comes at our third recommendation is just
this further documentation. And I think Les talked about that. They recognize the need
to get this documented, to get it out there, to where
it can be shared with people and give people a chance
to read it for themselves, raise other questions, I
think that’s what we see is the great opportunity is
when this stuff gets documented and shared, not only do
we get a better sense, I think we’ve heard a
very good explanation, but it’s always different
when you put it on paper. And so getting it on paper
causes you to ask yourself a lot more questions and to
have to be a lot more certain about what you’re saying. And, did we have any
recommendations or questions on the work plan update? So, I think a commendable
effort to assess things as to whether they’re
project wide activities or task specific activities. And finally, I think the
thing we were really pleased to see was that there’s a
sense of schedule flexibility. This is a rapidly developing work plan that just dove in and have
begun putting this study together and it’s rapidly evolving. They’re still identifying
what are all the tasks that need to be performed. Not in the sense of the six
tasks, but there are activities within each one of those tasks. So what are all those activities
that need to be performed? Well, we were happy to see
is as they begin to flush out what those activities are,
that there seems to be some flexibility in the schedule
to make sure that the proper quality work gets done in
order to answer the questions. And we were happy to see that
there isn’t some end date that causes us to say you know
what, we can only do x amount of analysis and still get
it done by that end date. So this is really encouraging
to us to see that there’s a commitment to that kind of quality. And then finally, just under
the other recommendations, we thought it was really
useful to see an outline of the, at least the
very high level outline of what the final report
would be from the CNA study and we’ve just encouraged
that that become a topic for all of our reviews. Every time the board meets,
just present us with how that outline is being flushed
out so we know what to expect to see in there. I think it also helps to
kind of drive the teams to know what’s the information
they need to be putting together to fill out that
outline and generate that report at the end of the day. So with that, anybody
wanna add anything else– – [Gentleman] When I was
talking about this spillway– – Questions? – Yeah, can I ask a process question? – Yep. – So, thanks for putting
together the little comment log. That’s a great idea and super helpful. Some of these comments
date back to June 19th and all of them are open. And I know we’ve got a
schedule to keep and things go through different phases, some
of the questions are really oriented towards beginning
stuff, like evaluation, criteria, things of that nature. It seems like there should
be some window of opportunity to either agree, concur, and
implement as oppose just kind of leaving things open for
an unextended period of time. Have there been any discussions
about what’s a reasonable horizon to kind of leave
things open and in process and things to that nature? – Yeah, here you go. – Yeah, I can start with that. So the idea here is, I think I have a mic actually, addition to being open or
closed we do note when we concur or also when we’re thinking
about a particular consideration and so the way we have it
set up is we’d like the board to close the items so since
we just put this together here we want to circle back with the board and so there are items on
there that from the department standpoint we think we
have addressed that. But this is not the
department closing the items. We’re looking to the board to close them. – Is there a way, because we
only have quarterly meetings, to maybe online or somewhere
have it so that we can kind of track what’s still open, what’s closed? ‘Cause again, you’ve got things
that are happening monthly and we’re meeting quarterly. So for us to stay up to
date on what’s happening or not happening that would be helpful. – [Man] Right. – I think that’s something we
can look at putting online. So on the website we can do
some periodic update then, maybe more frequently than the quarterly. Appreciate it.
– ‘Cause I know just from my perspective,
one of the comments that the review board has, I agree with. And the question is are they
being implemented and how would we see those things manifest. So it seems like you’ve
got that structure set up in this table, it’d just
be nice to see the closure and yes, in fact, it is
implemented and here it is. – Yeah, that’s retrievable. – And so Sergio, maybe one
of the things to consider for the next board meeting
is just having a part of the agenda that is set
aside for what your proposed status is and then part
of us writing our report we can easily concur or
give any clarifications. – That’s what we were planning on was for the third meeting.
– For the third meeting. Yeah. – So as John mentioned,
we just put this together. When we first had the agenda,
we had closed with a question mark but we thought that
would raise a lot of questions so we just left them open
because we are looking to the board to close them. – [John] Yep. – So, I think process wise,
just another one of those cases that the board only meets
so often and things rapidly develop in between meetings. Any other questions? – Does that mean that the board needs to meet more frequently? – I don’t know that we need
to meet more frequently. I know personally my notion
is that I would really like to see them have time to
get some things accomplished so that when we do meet
there’s meaningful progress. And I think, honestly, their
commitment at DWR has been to have you all meet every time we meet. So, I think it at least
seems to me from an outsider looking in that this seems to be set up in a reasonable fashion. (man coughing) – All right, so our meeting
agenda items is gonna go through and I think everyone
can read this just as well as I can read it to you. So, here’s the dates of
what’s coming up leading up to the next meeting. So, any questions? Of course, Rob– – One thing we discussed
before, was expanding to a four week time frame response to allow more time for
the ad hoc committee to, okay.
– Yes, that’s one. Yeah, that is one change
from the last one. One more time for you guys to
pull together your thoughts and grind this to us. So then with that item out of the way, then the remaining item
is if there’s any question or discussion then from the ad hoc group? – Yeah, you saw that
memorandum, that’s a circulating and please see that basically
task three addresses most of those items there
and that’s what I wanted to say, that those things that
had to do with the seepage and the green spots and evidently
whatever that process is that they talking about
with the casement drilling and all that would be
addressed before, you know, with the IRB so that we can
gain a confidence in it. ‘Cause if they took the
time to explain it while on the tour, it must be
important enough that, but I want to know that it
has the experts’ endorsement that it’s accurate and believable, that when we ultimately go
out, the community’s gonna be looking somewhat to the
Ad Hoc Committee to give, lack of a better term,
testimony to the fact that they’ve looked at this
and there’s reasonable things, you know, pronouncements
being made and that they can look for safe and reliable operation. That’s the major objective. Um, the other thing I guess on the river valve, that will
come up and be examined within the physical facilities. So I feel like those
things all being addressed, particularly after seeing
the task three summary there, I feel like that that is being addressed. But I think it gives the
IRB some recognition of why we want to know about it. – [Male] Sure. – So I think we’re going in
the right direction there. – Now on things that are blessed
by either the review board or the department, it’s always nice to have a
stamp and a signature by a PE just so we know that
there’s some credibility and substantial support and accountability behind an analysis or report. That it wasn’t just a general memo. – Yeah, what do you think? What do people feel about that? – So all right, that’s a good question and I guess we’re just reacting
to that right here off. And I believe other folks jumped in, but where we do the studies
that would tell the truth. – Yeah, I don’t have a
microphone but I’ll talk loud. Yeah, it’s our intention
that the engineering reports and studies that are
conducted will be signed by a licensing engineer. – And I think one of the
changes we made, you know, recently was, Ted– – What? – Ted is a Registered Civil
Engineer and he is now the Executive Manager over
dam safety and risk management for the overall state water project and then we’ve allocated Dave Tarcesian as a higher level manager
over the Dam Safety Program. So really, as thing are
going up to executive, it’s been vetted through
senior executive people who have the credentials
to recommend things in integrity, so. – All right, and I think
it’s more to the, you know, certifying that hey, what is
being stated, is it correct? I don’t want to speak for you, Bruin, but, that someone is certifying
as an engineer that yeah, these calcs look to show
what they portrait show, or you know, right? And these calcs show
what is being recommended or what is being affirmed
or confirmed, right? Is that? – [Bruin] That’s it, you got it. You got it right. I vouch for all this information. – And I don’t know if, I
don’t think we’ve seen it. But I know there was a
lot of data collected as far as the anchors
and viewing the drains. Is that something that we
could see from the ad hoc, is that something, I understand
that you guys have reviewed it as well, is that right? I mean, the IRB has or
has not reviewed that? – [IRB Speaker] Not yet. – Okay. I mean, at some future date,
that’s something that we’d like to see. Like hey, I’m obviously
saying yeah, this shows that the assumptions are correct, right, I think is what we were getting at, that this head works facility
is, you know, competent, doesn’t need to be replaced. I guess that’s really what
we’re looking at, right? – I think we’re gonna have
to continue to work together because at some level when we
have those technical studies, I’m speaking real broadly here, just the common risk is we’re
gonna find specific risks, specific measures, and a
lot of granular detail. That’s where we start getting
the security concerns. And so that’s where I just
wanna, I don’t wanna commit that the outside here
that every analysis we do we’re gonna be able to share
with you because this group because what we do share here,
we expect that to be public, we have to treat it that way. So, that’s where we’re
gonna have to work together to make sure that with the
IRB, with you, that we have a level of comfort on
what’s happening here. – But can I add to that, John? – I think I kinda wanna, I mean,
I believe Bruin is the only engineer on our ad hoc, so. – Or Larry. – And Larry, sorry, sorry. – [Larry] Safety in numbers. – I knew I was gonna mess that up. But maybe if it’s
something that, obviously, it’s gotta be something that
I’m not ever gonna really know, you know, but for them,
for people on our board that have that expertise,
maybe if it’s something that they can look at
and just go hey, yeah. Is that make sense? – I think as long as it’s not CEII data, then there’s no reason we shouldn’t. But I think another thing
that we’re trying to do and obviously we’re breaking
ground in the industry is bringing in another
expert to help us develop a risk communication plan. So how do we take what’s
really complicated engineering but turn it into information. ‘Cause all of this, we’ve
gotta eventually turn it into information we can provide
to you guys and the public that they can understand. And so, I’m not calling it, dumb it down, but really put it into a
perspective that is understandable. So we’ve taken it on because
I think all dam owners need to be able to provide
that information to all the sheriffs, all the local
AMAs, so we need to do that. So, we’re working on that, that’s– – I appreciate that Joel,
’cause that’s why I ask half the questions I do is to
get it down into in English that people that are watching
this are gonna appreciate. This is what our objectives
are or whatever it may be. – And I think you guys are
probably one of the most educated now on this dam’s stuff than
most of the other areas. So I think it’s really
important we’ve taken it on and maybe that can help
address that, Assemblyman. It’s probably not the whole
answer you’re looking for but I think we’re putting
all these pieces together to be able to better communicate. – Joel, this group is probably
a good resource for you in the development of that program. – Oh yeah. – You’ve got general community
folks that are interested and engaged and you can use
them as a sounding board and why don’t we work this
together as a collaborative as oppose to going out and
hiring said consultant, your task is coming back
and telling me the answer. – No, I think, I mean, you’re right. We’re, this is where we’re
gonna introduce that plan, build it with you guys. But we still need arms and legs, people helping us get it done. – [Man] Sure. – But yes, this is where we
would be vetting that process. – But not just vetting but
also developing the methods and strategies and the tools. This is a good resource for you. – Iterative process. – Yeah, don’t overlook this as a resource, is what I’m saying. – [Joel] Yeah, got it. – Joel, if you’d be so
kind, get a heads up to Director Nemeth. I’m gonna give her a call. I’d like to sit down with her
and James and the appropriate people and talk about the
levy and the dredging money and how we’ll program
that out to be expended. I want to track that in
the budget very carefully. – [Joel] I will, sir. – Thank you. – I do have one other question, Don. And it has to do with the
12D is a periodic regularly occurring thing and I was
just wondering why that caused the schedule extension since
it is known to come up. What made it different? – So, the legislation
said in the Part 12D, you need to do a risk assessment
following this particular set of FERC guidelines. And so, at the same
time in our CNA process, we were needing to do a risk assessment. And so, what the approach was,
instead of doing two separate risk assessments, which, it’s time consuming and
you’re concerned about how those would jive together,
the thought is let’s use the risk assessment that
we’re now required to do FERC, use that assessment– – The decision to integrate it then, okay. – Yeah, so then we do one
assessment but the result was that meant we had to adjust
the timing of the schedule, the processes, so hence the delay. – The follow up to that is
the supplemental problem farrier mode study that was required, what’s the status of that study? The supplementary? – Let’s see, I can talk to that. So we did a supplemental
PFMA as part of the spillway reconstruction work. This was done back in, I
believe it was, May of 2017. That process, you know, was completed. We’ll be providing that document
to the next Part 12D Board and then we’ll be reviewing
that document as well as our other potential failure
mode documents that have been prepared in the past. And using that as part of the
new potential failure mode analysis as part of the the
Part 12D process in the January to March timeframe next year. – Our question three that was submitted probably last meeting,
requested information on those different reports so that
we could follow along, that we can get up to
speed knowledge wise. Are they able to find 2014 report? I was not able to find the
supplementary report online. Has that gone public? – Yeah, so we had went
through the process, so those reports contain,
you know, basically a list of potential, you know, failure
modes for the facilities. And so, the 2014 one, we
went through the process of redacting it so that then
the materials that we placed publicly wouldn’t get into
the wrong hands for people that might have bad
intentions for the facilities. The supplemental report,
we would need to go through a similar process and it
takes time and resources to go through that redaction process. That report was very focused
on the spillway construction and as we’ve gotten past
the spillway construction, we really see the next
potential failure mode analysis that’s done in 2019 is really
being the broader one there. – I just want to follow up
with a couple of action items I want to make sure are
noted in this meeting. First of all, I just want to make sure that Congressman LaMalpha’s
request for the information documentation photos on the dam
being build on solid bedrock if we could get that? And then the other item
that was brought up earlier was this recent letter from
FERC dated October 25th to you Mr. Craddock, from Mr. Blackett. And Matt brought this up
about incorporating that in the winter flood operations,
water operations plan, that that would be looked at
and either incorporated or not or commented on, that those be taken as the two action items that
I see from earlier, thank you. Any questions? – No, we understand that request, Lauren, and we’ll document and follow up on that. – Thank you. – If I may, I think there’s
one thing that we can all agree on, it came out several times today, that the operations manual
is currently in effect is antiquated and incomplete. It didn’t consider that for one thing that the Marysville Lake was
built and it didn’t consider climate change as it is. And it seems that we could all
agree that forecast informed reservoir operations is the
future and that public safety being number one, thanks
for moving that Assemblyman, my Congressman is here (chuckling), to the forefront that we can
agree that we need to work on speeding that process up. And it seems like, just to
go to the public and say even in the interim that
DWR and everyone’s willing to manipulate the operations
that keep us safer. I hope we can all agree on
that and I think we can all work together on that. Bluntly, our meeting with the
Army Core, with the Senator, and with the Assemblyman
in Washington D.C., they were very less than
receptive to climate based forecasts, scientific
operations, and very linear in their responses to us. So, I think there’s something
we got to work on together there but I think I can leave
here thinking that we are all on the same page. Thank you. – Okay.
– All right. – No mas for me. – Well uh, thank everybody
again for spending the time. There was a lot of meeting
topics here, you know, and I think one we kinda
wanna take some time to process that and go
through some of the stuff and get some of our comments
and giving you some today that I think are very good. But we want to take some time to get you back some other
feedback and comments. And again, I appreciate everybody, the presentations were very
thorough and we appreciate that. – [Congressman] Well
thank you all very much. – Great, all right. – Good meeting.
– Thank you. (chairs rustling)

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